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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on the market design of auctions. I 
use computational and experimental techniques to make two types of contributions to 
the literature. First, I provide software that implements a state-of-the-art algorithm for 
solving multi-unit auctions with asymmetric bidders. This methodological 
contribution can be used by other economists to solve a variety of auction problems 
not considered in this dissertation. Second, I undertake the study of one auction 
environment in particular, utilizing my software to generate hypotheses when bidders 
participate in a particular sealed-bid, asymmetric multi-unit auction. These 
hypotheses are then tested in an experimental setting.  
Broadly speaking, economists study auctions for three reasons: (1) because a 
substantial amount of commerce is organized by auctions; (2) because many forms of 
exchange can be modeled as auctions, especially when strategic behavior is 
important; and (3) to determine how auctions can be used to achieve a suite of design 
goals. The first two reasons to study auctions are purely positive, while the third 
develops techniques that can be used for normative purposes. 
The motivation to study auctions from a positive perspective is obvious: billions 
of dollars of commerce are organized by auctions each year. Commodities such as 
eggs and tobacco (Sosnick (1963)), as well as differentiated goods such as wine and 
art (Ashenfelter (1989)), have been traded at auction for many hundreds of years. 
More recently, internet auctions have become important formats for the exchange of 
basic consumer goods (eBay, Yahoo!, etc.; Lucking-Reiley (2000)), and for business 




institutions such as the trading floor of a stock or commodity exchange can be 
usefully modeled as “double-auctions” (Friedman and Rust (1993)). Enduring 
research agendas have sought to determine why some trades are usually organized as 
auctions (Bulow and Klemperer (2009) and Wang (1993)), how well auctions 
aggregate information distributed over many agents (Wilson (1977)), in what 
circumstances the famed revenue equivalence theorem1 fails to hold (Maskin and 
Riley (2000)), or simply how results derived in the study of auctions relates to 
traditional price theory (Bulow and Roberts (1989)). 
The study of auctions from a mechanism design perspective considers how 
auctions can be used to obtain desirable outcomes such as optimal revenue or 
economic efficiency (Myerson (1981)), accurate price discovery (Hong and Shum 
(2004)), minimal winner’s curse (Levin, Kagel and Richard (1996)), etc. Indeed, 
auctions are not only manipulated to improve outcomes in existing markets, but are 
used in the creation of markets. Auctions of emissions permits, for example, allow 
economists to harness the power of markets to increase total social welfare by 
allocating property rights in an efficient way. The issues involved in the manufacture 
and manipulation of auctions are issues of market design, the field of economics 
concerning “The Economist as Engineer” (Roth (2002)).  
Some of the more prominent applications of actively-designed auctions include 
the use of auctions to sell government debt (Back and Zender (1993)), to distribute 
property rights for natural resources (Cramton (2009)) or spectrum rights (McMillan 
(1994)), to encourage environmental conservation (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der 
                                                 
1 The revenue equivalence theorem posits that in the benchmark model of auctions, the English, Dutch, 
first-price sealed-bid, and the second-price sealed-bid auctions all yield the same revenue to the seller. 




Hamsvoort (1997)), and to price externalities (Joskow, Schmalensee and Bailey 
(1996)).  
In each of the applications above, the designer of the auction is responsible for 
conceptualizing every facet of the market. As Al Roth puts it, “Market design 
involves a responsibility for detail, a need to deal with all of a market’s 
complications, not just its principal features. Designers therefore cannot work only 
with the simple conceptual models used for theoretical insights into the general 
working of markets. Instead, market design calls for an engineering approach.”2 The 
design of an auction market in practice goes beyond simply choosing from a menu of 
available auctions. Instead, the design process includes defining the property right or 
good to be auctioned, specifying the rules of the auction and the terms of payment, 
and in many cases includes rules governing behavior after the auction. 
A great deal of auction theory exists to guide the choices of market designers. 
However, in many cases theory provides only a rough guide. Practical details of the 
auction environment often violate one or more assumptions of the theoretical 
literature. Furthermore, even in those cases when the assumptions of a mathematical 
model are satisfied, equilibrium theory may offer only qualitative predictions. There 
are relatively few circumstances in which equilibrium theory can provide useful 
quantitative predictions of measures of interest, such as expected revenue and surplus. 
That is, theory often fails to provide a means to evaluate the economic significance of 
the difference between competing auction designs. 
Even very small complications to the benchmark models of auction behavior 
make it impossible to generate quantitative revenue or efficiency comparisons using 
                                                 




existing theory. For example, when bidders in an auction are in some way dissimilar 
(or asymmetric), it is in general not possible to provide a closed-form expression of 
equilibrium bidding behavior (there are exceptions, but they are special cases). 
Without an explicit expression of each bidders’ strategy, the market designer can 
often still make comparative static predictions, but certainly cannot quantify expected 
revenue, efficiency, or the distribution of surplus amongst bidders. 
Because of the frequent need to incorporate details that render analytical 
solutions difficult or impossible to derive, a market designer typically makes use of 
complementary tools: computational methods can be used to generate predicted 
bidding functions, and experimental methods can be used to test the predictions.  
The first part of this dissertation, comprising chapters 2 and 3, develops a 
computational technique that can be used to effectively approximate equilibrium 
bidding strategies in auction games. Bidding strategies are functions that specify an 
action (a bid) for every situation a bidder might face. Armantier, Florens and Richard 
(2008) introduced the concept of Constrained Strategic Equilibrium (CSE), a 
technique that approximates bidding strategies by imposing a parametric form. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on related computational techniques, and 
demonstrates how the CSE approach differs. Chapter 3 contains details of my 
implementation of the CSE algorithm. CSE_SOLVER, a suite of modular Matlab 
programs, implements the CSE algorithm and can be used to solve an arbitrary 
auction problem.  
Chapter 3 contains some extensions to the algorithm originally proposed by 




can be approximated by monotonically increasing polynomials. I show how positive 
polynomials can be used to approximate monotonic functions.3 Strategies that 
increase monotonically are often assumed in theory. The use of a functional form that 
is totally flexible, and yet is monotonic by construction, provides a computational 
method to match the theory. Using a function that is monotonic by construction 
enables the researcher to solve CSE problems with numerical techniques designed for 
unconstrained optimization. The benefit is potentially faster, more reliable solution of 
the set of fundamental equations that result from the CSE approach.  
I also introduce to the economics literature a technique for distribution estimation 
that is particularly well-suited to estimating the distributions generated during Monte 
Carlo simulations. Monte Carlo simulations are used in the CSE algorithm to 
approximate first order conditions of the constrained equilibrium. The solution of the 
system of equations generated by the CSE problem relies crucially on the ability to 
estimate the distribution of winning bids from these Monte Carlo simulations. The 
density estimation technique discussed in chapter 3, known as Target Distribution 
Estimation (TDE), allows a researcher to incorporate knowledge about the form of 
the distribution of the bids, while still maintaining the flexibility of a nonparametric 
estimator. The CSE procedure typically uses nonparametric density and distribution 
estimation techniques, as the distribution of the bids is not known a priori. However, 
the distribution of the type draws (values in a buy-auction and costs in sell-auction) is 
of course known. The distribution of equilibrium bids is a transformation of the 
                                                 
3 Positive polynomials are polynomials that always take on positive values, despite the fact that no 
restriction is made on the coefficients. Positive polynomials are constructed using a convolution 




known distribution of types. The TDE makes use of this information and can improve 
algorithm performance when standard nonparametric techniques fail. 
The second part of the dissertation, comprising chapters 4 and 5, use the 
computational techniques developed in chapters 2 and 3 to examine asymmetric 
multi-unit auctions. Asymmetric auctions are notoriously difficult to solve – standard 
numerical techniques used to derive equilibrium bidding functions rely on the 
specification of differential equations. These differential equations are derived from 
the first order conditions of each bidder’s objective function. When multiple units are 
auctioned simultaneously, the system of differential equations quickly becomes 
unmanageable. The CSE_SOLVER algorithm is robust enough to solve both 
benchmark auctions currently found in the literature, and a series of multi-unit 
auctions specified in chapter 4 of this dissertation. An experimental test of the 
predictions is presented in chapter 5 of this dissertation. Laboratory experiments are 
used to evaluate the predictions of the computational models. While individual 
behavior deviates from equilibrium predictions, aggregate results and comparative 
static predictions are consonant with the computational results. 
Terminology and Notation 
Terminology 
Bidder Types 
In the auction theory literature, it is common to refer to a bidder’s preferences, 
the draws from nature that characterize a bidder, as that bidder’s type. The term type 




instance, a bidder’s value for an item might be the draw from nature that uniquely 
characterizes the bidder in a buy-auction, an auction in which there is a single seller 
and many buyers, while a bidder’s cost of producing an item might be the equivalent 
term in a sell-auction, an auction in which there is a single buyer and many sellers. 
Throughout the dissertation I will use the term type when I discuss a generic situation 
or result, but will also use more specific terminology such as value or cost when it is 
appropriate. 
Auction Types 
As above, I will refer to auctions in which many buyers compete to purchase 
item(s) from a single monopolistic seller as “buy-auctions” and to auctions in which 
many sellers compete to provide item(s) to a single monopsonistic buyer as “sell-
auctions.” 
Constrained Strategic Equilibrium (CSE) 
I will refer to Constrained Strategic Equilibrium, or CSE, as both an algorithm 
and an equilibrium concept distinct from Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). A BNE 
is defined by a set of strategies such that the strategy of each player is a best response 
to the strategies of all other players. A CSE is defined by a set of constrained 
strategies such that each player’s strategy is a best response to the strategies of all 
other players. When I refer to solving for a CSE numerically, I will refer to the CSE 
algorithm. 
Notation 
X ≡  Bidder type (draw from nature), a random variable. The ith bidder’s type is 




x ≡  The realization of a bidder type. The realization of the ith bidder’s type is denoted 
ix . In Monte Carlo experiments, several realizations are drawn for each bidder’s type. 
The draw of the ith bidder’s type in the mth Monte Carlo experiment is denoted imx . 
( )F ≡i  Cumulative distribution function of the draw from nature, x . 
b ≡  Bid. 
( )i is x ≡  Strategy of player i; a mapping from type-space to bid-space. ( )i ib s x= . 
a ≡  A coefficient of a parametrized bidding strategy. 
( )G ≡i  Cumulative distribution function of the critical (marginal) bid. 
( ) ( )g dG=i i . 
( )H ≡i  Cumulative distribution function of the target distribution (used in a 
procedure to estimate an unknown distribution). 
( ) ( )h dH=i i . 
( )p x ≡  A polynomial (I use this notation to represent a generic polynomial, as 
opposed to a positive or a monotonic polynomial). 
ija ≡  The j
th coefficient of the bidding function of the ith representative bidder. 
i ≡a  The vector of coefficients parameterizing the i
th representative bidder’s strategy. 
ijb ≡  Same as ija  (sometimes necessary to distinguish one type of coefficient from 
another). 
( )km x ≡  A thk -stage monotonic polynomial. 
( )km x′  The derivative of a thk -stage monotonic polynomial, which is itself a positive 
polynomial. A positive polynomial ( )km x′  is expressed in nested form as  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1k k km x m x q x−′ ′= , 
where  
( ) ( )2 2 21 2k k k kq x xa x a b⎡ ⎤≡ − + +⎣ ⎦ , and  
( )0m x′ ≡ λ  by definition. 





ld ≡  Coefficient on x  to the power l  in the 
thj  step of the positive polynomial. 
• Notation is used to express ( )lq x  in a more compact and convenient way. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 20 1 2
j j j
jq d d x d x⎡ ⎤= + +⎣ ⎦ , therefore, ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 2 20 1 21,  2 ,  j j jj j jd d a d a b= = − = + . 
( )j
lD ≡  The total coefficient on x  to the power l  in the 
thj  step of the positive 
polynomial. The total coefficient is a function of all of the coefficients d  from the 




Chapter 2: A Simulation Approach to Approximating 
Equilibrium 
Introduction 
Two things are accomplished in this chapter: I review the literature on 
computational techniques used to approximate equilibrium bidding functions, and I 
set up the general problem to be solved using the CSE approach.  
The literature review is focused on a technique pioneered by Marshall, et al. 
(1994), hereafter MMRS. The MMRS-type approach is the dominant approach in the 
literature on numerical computation of auction equilibrium. Several authors have 
followed in the footsteps of MMRS, making meaningful improvements to the original 
algorithm. The basic idea behind the MMRS approach stays the same, however, and 
there are similarities between the MMRS approach and the constrained strategic 
equilibrium approach first introduced by Armantier, Florens and Richard (1998), 
which is implemented in this dissertation. 
Both algorithmic approaches use as building blocks the first order conditions of 
each bidder’s objective function, although the expression of these objective functions 
are different in each algorithm. The objective function of bidder i in a first-price, 
sealed-bid auction in its most general form can be written ( ) ( ), Pr |i iU x b win b× : the 
utility of winning with a bid of b, multiplied by the probability of winning with that 
same bid. Under the MMRS approach, the expression of ( )Pr |i win b  is explicit – the 




the model, including the known distributions of each bidder’s type. The CSE 
approach is more direct. Rather than expressing the probability of winning in 
primitive terms, the probability is estimated directly from Monte Carlo experiments. 
The MMRS approach leads to a more explicit representation of the objective 
function, and thus the first order condition, which requires unique input “by-hand” in 
order to make the algorithm appropriate for a particular auction problem. The CSE 
approach sacrifices some accuracy for greater generality.  
Relaxing the Assumptions of the Benchmark Auction Model: 
Why Computational Approaches are Necessary 
Computational techniques are a valuable tool used in the analysis of many real-
world auction institutions. Computational techniques are most useful for analyzing 
auctions when: 
1. Equilibrium strategies are known not to exist, but benchmark bid 
functions would be useful to derive. 
2. It is unknown whether or not equilibrium strategies exist. 
3. Equilibrium strategies are known to exist, but it is difficult or impossible 
to derive analytical expressions for the bid functions. 
 
Auctions in which bidders draw their types from more than one probability 
distribution, commonly referred to as asymmetric auctions, are a good example of 
auctions that often require computational analysis for one of the three reasons above. 
The symmetry assumption captures the notion that all bidders in an auction share 




their opponents. Bidder i views all opposing bidders as having drawn their types from 
a certain distribution, and believes each other bidder assumes the same, so that the 
only thing differentiating bidders is the realization of their draw. Formally, suppose 
that each of N bidders draw their preferences for an item independently from a 
continuous distribution F, that each bidder knows their own draw from F but not that 
of any other bidder, that each bidder is risk-neutral, and that these facts are common 
knowledge among all bidders.4 This model is known as the symmetric Independent 
Private Values (symmetric IPV) model of auctions. Assuming all bidders are 
motivated by profit maximization, it is straightforward to find a single strategy s that 
characterizes the equilibrium behavior of all bidders in a first-price, sealed-bid 
auction. 
Symmetry is the principal assumption of the benchmark IPV model of auctions 
relaxed in this dissertation. Relaxing the symmetry assumption means allowing each 
of the N bidders in the auction to draw their preferences from an idiosyncratic 
distribution ,  1,...,iF i N= .
5  
We study asymmetric auction models because there is often reason to believe 
that bidders are ex ante heterogeneous, and so will pursue idiosyncratic strategies. 
The rules of an auction might favor certain classes of bidder, as in FCC spectrum 
auctions (Ayres and Cramton (1996), McMillan (1994)) and government procurement 
                                                 
4 F is commonly assumed to be twice continuously differentiable and to be defined on a compact 
support. 
5 Allowing for bidders to draw their preferences from idiosyncratic distributions is the most common 
way to relax the symmetry assumption. However, it is sometimes assumed that bidders draw their 
preferences from a single distribution, but that other differences between bidders generate an 
asymmetry. For instance, bidders might behave differently for some reason, or it might be assumed 
that bidders have idiosyncratic utility functions, or that bidders are treated differently in the auction 
because of an observable trait, etc. Such assumptions would also lead to a model that would properly 




(McAfee and McMillan (1989), Denes (1997), Hubbard and Paarsch (2009), 
Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2009), Marion (2007), Marion (2009)). In many more 
cases there is no favoritism inherent in the auction rules, but there are observable 
differences between the bidders that partially reveal a bidder's type. Cramton (1995) 
provides some salient examples in the context of the U.S. Narrowband PCS6 auction:  
Of the 25 bidders, a few bidders were known to have high values because of 
their large market share, prior product development, or other advantages. 
PageNet, for example, had by far the largest market share in paging going into 
the auction. It also had a well developed product, VoiceNow, that required a 
substantial slice of narrowband spectrum for nationwide distribution. McCaw 
was known to have deep pockets, as were some of the other large firms 
(AirTouch and BellSouth). These differences were known by all. The relevant 
auction model to analyze was clearly one with asymmetric bidders. (p. 50). 
 
The General (Asymmetric) IPV Model 
Before proceeding further, it will be helpful to introduce in detail the 
fundamental auction problem we are seeking to solve. The fundamental auction 
problem will be introduced in the context of a single-unit auction. This setting is the 
easiest to analyze, and all of the literature I subsequently review deals exclusively 
with this case. The problem will be generalized to the multi-unit case later in the 
dissertation.  
                                                 




Suppose that each of the N bidders draw types, or values, from a (potentially) 
idiosyncratic distribution iF  on compact support. That is, we know that ~i ix F , and 
[ ] ,i i ix x x∈ . Bidders are risk neutral and so the utility of winning a buy-auction with 
bid b when a bidder’s type is ix  can be expressed as  
 ( ); i iu b x x b= − . 
Index the bidders by 1,2,..., N  and, without loss of generality, consider the 
problem of deciding what to bid from the perspective of bidder 1. Bidder 1 seeks to 
maximize the expected returns from bidding, i.e. the bidder seeks to maximize 
 ( ) ( )1 Pr |x b win b− . (1) 
The probability that bidder 1 will win with a bid of b is the probability that each 
of the other 1N −  bids will be below b. Assuming that the 1N −  other bidders follow 
strategies ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 3 3, ,..., N Ns x s x s x , the probability can be expressed as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 2 3 3Pr ... N Nx b b s X b s X b s X− > > >∩ ∩ ∩ . 
Assuming that strategies are monotonically increasing in x , i.e. that each bidder 
submits bids that are non-decreasing in their value for the item, we know that each of 
the strategies is  has an inverse. Denote the inverse function corresponding to is  by 
iφ . Then bidder 1’s problem can be rewritten in a more useful form as 




Using the inverse strategies allows us to express bidder 1’s objective function in 
a more useful form because we know the distribution of each iX  by assumption. 
Isolating the iX  in the expression allows us to use the knowledge of the distributions 
iF  and the independence of each draw ix   to finally write bidder 1’s objective 
function as 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 2 2 3 3 ... N Nx b F b F b F bφ φ φ− × × × × . 
To find the optimal b, differentiate with respect to b in order to obtain the first 
order condition 
 ( ) '1
2 {2,..., }, 1
.
NN
i i j i
i j N j i i
x b f F Fφ
= = ≠ =
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
− × × =⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟
⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ∏ ∏  (2) 
This first order condition gives us a differential equation (in terms of iφ ) that 
characterizes the equilibrium of the auction. The boundary conditions of the ordinary 
differential equation can be written 
 ( )  i i ib xφ =  (3) 
and 
 ( )i i ib xφ = , (4) 
where  ib  denotes the bid corresponding to the lowest possible type-draw  ix  and ib  




When the N differential equations (2)-(4) (one-per-bidder) are simultaneously 
satisfied by a set of optimal strategies ( ) ( )1 1{ ,..., }N Ns x s x , we have a candidate 
equilibrium.7 
In order to gain intuition, it is instructive to set up the model in a special case. 
Suppose there are two bidders, i.e. that N=2. In that case, the objective function of 
bidder 1 simplifies to 
 
( ) ( )( )





x b b s X




and the resulting first order condition can be written 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )'1 2 2 2 2 2x b f b b F bφ φ φ− = . (6) 
This yields an ordinary differential equation describing how the inverse bid 
function 2φ  varies with b . The exact same procedure, when performed from the 
perspective of bidder 2, yields 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )'2 1 1 1 1 1x b f b b F bφ φ φ− = . (7) 
Along with a set of boundary conditions, these two equations characterize the 
equilibrium. To further simplify the example, let [ ]1 2, 0,1X X ∈ . This, with one 
additional assumption discussed below, is the first model specified by MMRS.8  With 
the assumption of [0,1] common support, we can write the boundary conditions: 
 ( ) ( )1 20 0 0φ φ= = , (8) 
                                                 
7 Finding a solution to the system of differential equations does not constitute a proof of equilibrium. 
To prove that the N-tuple ( ) ( )1 1{ ,..., }N Ns x s x is an equilibrium, we must show that none of the 
bidders can profitably deviate from the strategy ( )i is x . 
8 MMRS specify a number of different permutations of their basic model of coalitions. The model here 





 ( ) ( )1 2 1b bφ φ= = . (9) 
To see why (8) holds in equilibrium, realize that a bidder with a value draw of 0 
will never submit a bid 0b > , as doing so can only result in a loss. To see why there 
is a single maximum bid b  for both bidders, suppose otherwise. Suppose ( )1 1 1bφ =  
and ( )2 2 1bφ =  and, without loss of generality, suppose 1 2b b> . In this case, whenever 
bidder 1 realized a value of 1, bidder 1 could reduce their bid to 2b  without reducing 
their probability of winning the auction. Therefore, 1 2b b b= =  and we get   (9).
9 
The system of differential equations (6) and (7), with boundary conditions (8) 
and (9), completely characterize the equilibrium in the MMRS two-bidder case. 
In general, the asymmetric auction model (2)-(4) cannot be solved analytically. 
That is, a closed-form expression cannot be derived for the equilibrium strategies of 
each of the bidders. In the next section, numerical solution techniques developed by 
MMRS to solve (6)-(9) (a special case of (2)-(4))will be reviewed in detail. Although 
many special cases of the asymmetric model have been solved explicitly,10 the 
computational approach is necessary for the analysis of the vast majority of 
asymmetric auction problems.   
                                                 
9 Using the assumption of a common support allows me to derive (8) and (9) using the straightforward 
arguments above. Without the assumption of a common support [0,1], similar boundary conditions can 
still be established, but the necessary argument is more nuanced. The specific example here contains 
all the necessary intuition and comes at the cost of very little generality. 
10 Vickrey (1961) famously solved a very special case in which one bidder draws their value from a 
degenerate distribution. A model with two bidders and uniform distribution of types was solved first by 




Computational Approaches: A Review of the Literature 
In order to generate predicted bidding functions when analytical solutions to (2)-
(4) are unknown, authors have resorted to a number of different computational 
strategies. I will not attempt to provide a complete catalog of available techniques, 
but will discuss the major methods that have been employed, and characterize the 
advantages and disadvantages of each.  
The seminal paper in the field of numerical analysis of auctions was by Marshall, 
et al. (1994). MMRS construct a model that can be re-cast as a special case of (6) - (9) 
when the distributions iF  are assumed to be uniform. MMRS use this model to study 
collusion. The MMRS model allows for a sort of “supper-bidder” to form as a result 
of cooperation among sub-groups of the N bidders. These super-bidders act 
differently than any atomistic bidder would, creating an asymmetry that makes it 
difficult to derive an analytical solution. The basic technique pioneered by MMRS 
attempts to numerically solve the differential equations (6) and (7). MMRS specify an 
approximating function for the (transformed) inverse strategies (in this case the 
approximating function is a series of piecewise polynomial expansions at regular 
intervals). Rather than choosing a starting value that satisfies (8) and using a standard 
shooting algorithm, the major innovation of MMRS is the development of a back-
stepping algorithm. To see why this unusual method of solving the differential 
equations (6) and (7) is necessary, rearrange (6) to isolate the inverse strategy 
function. 






















φ =  and invert both sides of (10) to get 










= . (11) 
As 2X  approaches its lower support from the right (so that ( )2 bφ  approaches 0), the 
denominator of the expression above tends to zero, and so the slope of the bid 
function 2s  tends to infinity. This makes the differential equation behave poorly near 
the lower support.12 Because of this pathology, the differential equation (11) cannot 
be solved using standard techniques. 
MMRS solve this problem by employing a back-solve method. They select a 
starting point for their algorithm by guessing b  in (9) and step backwards, tracing out 
the differential equation until a solution is found such that both (8) and (9) are 
simultaneously satisfied. 
The virtue of the MMRS algorithm is its accuracy. The drawback of this 
technique for solving auction problems is its lack of generality – the program needs to 
be modified substantially for use in more complex cases. This is because the 
technique uses a considerable amount of input, i.e. a significant amount of work is 
done “by hand” prior to running the algorithm. In order to express the differential 
equation in terms of the primitives of the model iF , the system must be explicitly 
                                                 
11 The derivative of an inverse function is the reciprocal of the derivative of the original function 













rewritten for every special case considered. Additionally, MMRS use a 
transformation of the original differential equations that enhances numerical stability. 
Several contributions following in the tradition of MMRS use increasingly 
sophisticated methods to improve the convergence properties of the original 
algorithm. Li and Riley (2007) recently offered a substantial generalization of the 
MMRS algorithm that, among other improvements, uses a more intelligent procedure 
to select the intervals used in the approximation of iφ . Li and Riley characterize the 
system of differential equations more generally, allowing for more than two types of 
bidders and for the fundamental preference parameter to be distributed other than 
uniform. Riley and Li have made their algorithm, implemented in a software 
distribution called BIDCOMP2, available for download.13 
Gayle and Richard (2008) offer an alternative software package that, like 
BIDCOMP2, solves a general system of differential equations that characterize any 
single-unit asymmetric IPV model.14,15 The implementation of Gayle and Richard 
allows for arbitrary combinations of distributions of the preference parameter. For 
example, a hybrid distribution of types can be specified based on data the user 
possesses. This distribution can then be fed into the Gayle and Richard solver. The 
essential idea behind the Gayle and Richard algorithm is unchanged from MMRS and 
Li and Riley, however. Gayle and Richard seek to solve the same differential 
equations as MMRS and Li and Riley – the major improvement offered by Gayle and 
Richard (2008) is in the accuracy with which they approximate the inverse bid 
                                                 
13 The download page is located at http://www.econ.ucla.edu/riley/bidcomp/, although, as of this 
writing, several of the files necessary to run key examples are missing due to broken links. 
14 Gayle and Richard’s software is available at http://capcp.psu.edu/AsymmetricAuctions/index.html. 
The software is programmed in FORTRAN90.  




functions. Gayle and Richard use local Taylor-series as the approximating function in 
their particular application.  
Although we have focused on MMRS-type approaches thus far, there are other 
notable approaches to numerically computing equilibrium. 
Athey (1997) takes the approach of discretizing the action space – she restricts 
bidders to submit one bid from a finite menu of possible bids. This simplification 
allows a much more straightforward approach to calculating equilibrium – Athey 
solves a best response (fixed-point) problem at a finite number of points. Athey 
proceeds by solving a series of individual optimization problems, each determining 
the point at which a bidder switches from bidding at one discrete point to the next-
highest discrete point. 
Bajari (2001) compares the performance of three algorithms, two of which are 
similar to the algorithms we have already reviewed, and one of which is similar in 
spirit to the algorithm used in this dissertation. Bajari’s first algorithm is again 
essentially that of MMRS – by finding a solution to the one stable boundary 
condition, the fundamental differential equations can be solved. Bajari reports that 
this algorithm, though fast and efficient for solving the auction problems posed by 
MMRS, can be slow to converge in his applied work. Bajari’s second algorithm 
begins with an initial guess of the bidding functions (usually the guess is the zero-
profit bid function where each bidder submits a bid equal to their type) and then 
computes a (potentially infinite) series of best responses. In some sense, this is similar 
to Athey’s algorithm, but the continuous action space means that cycling can easily 




second algorithm can be quick to converge, especially if a good guess of the 
equilibrium bidding function can be provided, but again, infinite cycling is possible.16 
Finally, Bajari’s third algorithm is similar to the methods introduced by 
Armantier, Florens and Richard (1998), and so to the methods that I use in this 
dissertation. Bajari’s third algorithm uses global polynomials to approximate the 
inverse bid functions. Rather than guessing an endpoint value that satisfies a 
boundary condition and back-solving, Bajari treats the differential equation as an 
equality constraint (which can be transformed into a system of zeros) that should 
approximately hold when a high-order polynomial is used to estimate the inverse bid 
function with sufficient precision. Using a polynomial to approximate the equilibrium 
inverse bidding function reduces the problem to one of finding coefficients that 
minimize a system of transformed differential equations (the transformed equations 
should theoretically equal zero in equilibrium, so minimizing their value provides an 
effective algorithm). Bajari evaluates the fundamental differential equations at a grid 
of points covering the range of feasible bids, and uses a nonlinear least squares 
algorithm to find the polynomial coefficients that minimize the transformed 
equations. 
The Constrained Strategic Equilibrium technique is similar to Bajari’s third 
algorithm. The CSE algorithm was first introduced by Armantier, Florens and 
Richard (1998), and further developed in Armantier and Richard (2000) and 
Armantier, Florens and Richard (2008). 
                                                 
16 I have implemented this algorithm myself and have found that it often cycles when used to solve 




Constrained Strategic Equilibrium 
The idea underlying the Constrained Strategic Equilibrium technique is both 
extremely simple and totally general. Although I develop the technique here in the 
context of auctions, the technique applies to Bayesian games in general. 
Before developing the formal framework, it will be helpful to introduce the 
intuition behind CSE. One way to understand the idea of a CSE is to view it as an 
extension of Rothkopf’s (1969) original “markup” model. Rothkopf’s initial insight 
was to consider what bidders might do if they were constrained to submit bids that 
were linear functions of their draws. The markup strategy is simple and intuitive: a 
buyer will submit a bid that is some constant markup17 of his draw from nature, a x× , 
the parameter a  being a fraction in the range [0,1], and chosen intelligently to 
maximize expected gains. In the context of a particular common value model, 
Rothkopf showed that if the bidding functions ( );s x a  were constrained to be linear, 
i.e. of the form ( );s x a ax= , and a set of coefficients a  were found to define an 
equilibrium of the restricted game, then these same coefficients would be an 
equilibrium of the unrestricted game as well. Rothkopf’s conclusions are not relevant 
to the IPV model here, but his simple suggestion to consider linear strategies 
foreshadows the CSE approach. 
Note the similarity between Rothkopf’s idea and the discretization of the action 
space imposed by Athey (1997). Both assumptions simplify the search for an 
                                                 
17 Rothkopf introduced his model in the context of a procurement auction, i.e. an auction where bidders 
compete to sell an item to a single buyer. The term “markup” then had the intuitive appeal of referring 
to price as a markup of each bidder's cost of production. In the context of an auction where a single 
seller receives bids from many buyers, a more appropriate term might be “mark-down” instead. We 




equilibrium by restricting the action space in some way. Athey discretizes the action 
space by positing that each bidder chooses from a menu of available bids; Rothkopf 
allows for bidders to choose instead among a family of linear strategies. While 
Athey’s method requires a point-by-point analysis of the auction problem, Rothkopf’s 
method uses a single coefficient to define the entire strategy profile. 
In general, the CSE approach is to use a set of coefficients to define the strategy 
profile. Rather than restrict the strategy space to be parameterized by a single 
coefficient per bidder (Rothkopf's linear case), Armantier, Florens and Richard 
(2003) proposed that an arbitrary number of coefficients per bidder could be used to 
parameterize the strategy profile. 
In order to develop the CSE solution procedure, we will set up the same problem 
reviewed above in (6) through (9) as a constrained strategy problem. We will then 
generalize the notation and procedure so that the CSE algorithm can handle any 
auction problem. 
Recall from above that there are two bidders, each of whom draws their type 
from an idiosyncratic distribution iF . To solve for an equilibrium strategy of bidder 1 
with unconstrained strategies, we must find some bid b that maximizes bidder 1’s 
objective function for every possible value of X . We did this above by finding 




To solve for an equilibrium of the constrained strategy model, we substitute 
( )1;s x 1a ,18 a strategy constrained to take a particular functional form, for b in (1) to 
get 
 ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1; Pr | ;x s x win s x− 1 1a a . (12) 
The ( )1;s x 1a  can in principal be any function that can be parameterized by a vector 
of coefficients 1a , for example an ordinary quadratic polynomial ( )1;s x =1a  
2
10 11 1 12 1a a x a x+ + . Rather than finding the argmax 1 *b  of (1), we search for the 
optimal coefficients 1 *a  of (12). That is, we seek to find
19 
 ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1* arg max{ ; Pr | ; }x s x win s x a= −1 1a a , 
for any possible realization 1x . 
Let 1G  be the distribution of the highest bid that is not submitted by bidder 1. 
Then we can immediately rewrite (12) as  
 ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1; ;x s x G s x− 1 1a a . (13) 
Note the difference between how the probability of winning is represented in (5) 
and how it is represented in (13). Herein lies a key difference between the CSE 
algorithm implemented in CSE_SOLVER and MMRS-type algorithms. To obtain an 
expression for ( )Pr |win b in (5), we noted that bidder 1 wins when ( )2 2b s x> . In 
order to transform the expression ( )Pr |win b  into a function of the known 
                                                 
18 Recall that bold notation is used to represent vectors of coefficients (see the Notation section in 
chapter 1). 
19 Note that the imposition of constrained strategies need not be very restrictive at all. Since ( );s x a  
can take on any parameterized form, we can approximate the true strategy function ( )s x  to any 
degree desirable. In particular, the Weierstrass theorem tells us that we can approximate any 
continuous function to a desired degree of accuracy using a simple polynomial. See Armantier, Florens 




distributions iF , we used the assumed monotonicity of the strategy 2s  to isolate 2X . 
This allowed us to rewrite ( )( )2 2Pr b s X>  as ( )( )2 2Pr b Xφ > , and since we know 
the distribution of 2X , we were finally able write the probability of winning 
explicitly as ( )( )2 2F bφ . 
The CSE algorithm takes a more direct approach. Rather than expressing the 
probability of winning in terms of the distribution of types, we express the probability 
of winning in terms of the distribution of bids. Given the distribution and density of 
types and the relationship ( )b s x= , we can derive the density of bids ( )g b  using a 
straightforward transformation of variables 
 ( ) ( ) dxg b f x
db
= . 
If there exist strategies s mapping types to bids, and the types are random variables, 
then the bids themselves are also random variables. 
Rather than expressing the probability of winning in terms of the distribution of 
types, the CSE algorithm estimates the probability of winning directly in terms of the 
distribution of bids. Using this definition of 1G  in (13), we can proceed to solve for 




The choice variables of bidder 1 are the parameters 1a  of the strategy s . The 
first order condition with respect to the jth parameter 1 ja  is written 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1 1 1 1
1
; ; ; 0
j
s g s x x s x G s x
a
∂
× × − − =
∂ 1 1 1







 denotes the partial derivative of the parameterized strategy function with 
respect to the jth parameter and 1 1dG g= . If there are k parameters specifying the 
strategy s , we have k first order conditions corresponding to bidder 1’s objective 
function 
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where the only difference between each of the first order conditions above is 
accounted for by the first term, the partial derivative of the strategy function with 
respect to the appropriate coefficient. 
By an exactly analogous procedure, we also get k first order conditions 
corresponding to the objective function of bidder 2 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
2 2 2 2 2 2
21
2 2 2 2 2 2
22
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
; ; ; 0
; ; ; 0
...
; ; ; 0.
k
s g s x x s x G s x
a
s g s x x s x G s x
a





















To find the coefficients ( )*, *1 2a a  that completely characterize an equilibrium in 
constrained strategies, we approximately solve the system of equations (15) and (16). 
Note that equations (15) and (16) are expressed in terms of a single realization of the 
pair ( )1 2,X X . Of course, we seek to find coefficients ( )*, *1 2a a  that approximately 
solve (15) and (16) for arbitrary realizations of 1X  and 2X . To do this, we use 
Monte Carlo sampling and a penalty function representation of each first order 
condition. That is, we use Monte Carlo sampling to find coefficients ( )*, *1 2a a  that 
minimize a summarization of the first order conditions when 1X  and 2X  take on 
arbitrary values. 
M-good, N-bidder Case 
Generalizing from the two-bidder case is straightforward. The CSE problem with 
N bidders and M identical goods at auction is a system of N M k× ×  equations, where 
k is the degree of the parameterized strategy functions ( )1,s x 1a , ( )2 2,s x a , .., 
( ),N Ns x a . 
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The only difference between the M-unit case and the single-unit case is in the 
estimation of the distribution and density of the marginal bid, iG  and ig . In the 
single-unit case of a buy-auction, ( )iG x  represents the probability that the highest 
bid of all bidders except i is less than x. In the M-unit case, ( )iG x  represents the 
probability that the Mth-highest bid of all bidders except i is less than x.  
Stages of the CSE Algorithm 
To sum up, the stages of the CSE algorithm are: 
1. (Strategy Choice): Specify a family of functions to represent each bidder’s 
strategy. 
2. (Initialization Stage):  Specify starting values 01 2{ , ,..., }Na a a  for the 
parameters of each bidder’s k-parameter strategy (the superscript “0” above 
denotes the initial stage). 
3. Evaluate the first order condition with parameters 01 2{ , ,..., }Na a a  for each 
auction. Note that there are mc auctions, where mc is the Monte Carlo size. 
4. Calculate a single value for each first order condition based on a penalty 
function Ω :20  
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5. (Optimization Stage): Use an optimization routine to solve the system of 
equations above that approximate the parameterized set of first order 
conditions. Solve in terms of the choice variables 1 2{ , ,..., }Na a a . 
6. Evaluate the candidate equilibrium characterized by 1 2{ , ,..., }*Na a a , the result 
of step 5. 
7. If the equilibrium is satisfactory,21 stop; else increase the degree of the 
approximating function: k = k + 1. 
8. Return to step 2.
                                                 




Chapter 3: Implementation of the CSE Algorithm 
Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss implementation of the CSE algorithm. I review the key 
components of a successful implementation, and discuss my specific choices of how 
to execute the algorithm. Finally, the procedure is benchmarked; it is used to solve 
auction problems (both symmetric and asymmetric) appearing in the literature. 
Recall that there are two defining characteristics of the CSE algorithm: 
1. The bid function itself is approximated by a parameterized continuous 
function. Other state-of-the-art algorithms use point-wise approximations 
rather than continuous parameterizations of the bid function, and/or 
approximate the inverse bid function rather than the bid function itself. 
2. The conditional probability of winning, as embodied in the distribution 
and density of the marginal bid, is estimated directly based on Monte Carlo 
experiments. MMRS-type algorithms represent the probability of winning as a 
transformation of variables based on the distribution of types. 
A successful implementation of the CSE algorithm requires that the conditional 
probability of winning be estimated accurately, that the parameterization of the 
bidders’ strategies be flexible yet parsimonious, and that a robust optimization routine 
can be used to find the solution to the necessary first order conditions (a system of 
zeros). 
The algorithm is implemented as a suite of Matlab programs called 




bidding functions in any pay-as-bid, sealed-bid auction. I discuss especially the 
constrained strategies that I implement in CSE_SOLVER, and how I estimate the 
probability of winning for each bidder. I make use of available optimization routines 
that can be integrated directly into the suite of programs. 
The algorithm is programmed in a modular style that allows any auction game to 
be submitted to the solver without modification of the core script. The user writes a 
script that carries out any desired number of instances of a given auction22 and returns 
a vector of critical bids.23 CSE_SOLVER uses this vector to estimate G, the 
probability of winning from the perspective of a given bidder, and g, the associated 
density. The first order conditions are formed based on the user’s choice of 
parameterization of the strategies and the estimates of G and g, and then one of 
several optimization routines can be used to find the set of coefficients that solves the 
system of zeros. 
The implementation of the CSE algorithm uses two strategies to estimate the 
probability of winning based on data generated from Monte Carlo experiments. Either 
kernel methods or orthogonal polynomials are used to estimate G and g in the initial 
stage and, if necessary, target distribution methods are used for increased accuracy in 
a refinement stage. Kernel and orthogonal polynomial methods are well known, so I 
will provide only a cursory review of how they are implemented. The target 
distribution method is much less well known. I provide a full explanation of the target 
distribution method below. 
                                                 
22 This script solves the winner determination problem. 
23 The script provided for this purpose is itself easy to manipulate. For most auctions, only a few 
parameters will need to be changed. If an auction is to be solved that does not conform to the script 






Both basic global polynomials and monotonic polynomials are implemented in 
CSE_SOLVER. The construction of monotonic polynomials is discussed at length 
below. These strategy functions can be used to approximate with arbitrary precision 
any continuous function. In theory, each of these functions is capable of 
approximating an arbitrary function. In practice, the four parameterizations offer 
advantages and disadvantages.  
Polynomial Strategies 
( ) ( ) 1 2, , 1 ,2 ,1 ,0; ; ...K Ki K i i K i K i i is x a p x a a x a x a x a x a−−= ≡ + + + + +  
There are several advantages to using a basic polynomial to approximate bidding 
functions. Simple global polynomials are extremely flexible. The Weierstrass 
approximation theorem tells us that any continuous function defined on a bounded 
interval can be uniformly approximated by a single polynomial. Polynomials are also 
extremely easy to construct and fast to evaluate using Horner’s method. As a purely 
practical matter, if the estimated bidding functions are to be exported to another 
software package, say for use in a structural econometric exercise, global polynomials 
are equally easy to represent in any computer language, including in a spreadsheet. 
However, in some cases numerical problems can arise with a single global 
representation of the bidding strategies. It is well known that polynomials tend to 
diverge near the endpoints of a closed interval when fit to data. This behavior, known 




addition, high-order polynomials can fit data too well, taking on spurious features of 
the simulated data (“overfitting”), and often becoming non-monotonic. 
Monotonic Polynomial Strategies 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' ' 2 2 21 1 2k k k k k km x m x m x xa x a b− ⎡ ⎤= = × − + +⎣ ⎦∫ ∫  
In auction theory, it is commonly assumed that bidding functions are monotonic. 
Equilibrium strategies are known to be monotonic in many situations where 
computational methods are needed to derive explicit bidding functions (Lebrun 
(1996); Lebrun (1999)). In each of the MMRS-style algorithms reviewed in chapter 1, 
the assumption of monotonicity is maintained in order to derive an inverse bidding 
function. As a purely theoretical matter, then, it is desirable to have the option to 
force the constrained strategy to be monotonic. Moreover, if an equilibrium bidding 
function either does not exist or cannot be found, the assumption of monotonicity is 
likely a desirable feature of any approximate solution.  
Of course, a regular polynomial construction could be used in conjunction with a 
constrained optimization technique. That is, we could search for the polynomial 
functions that most nearly satisfy the system of first order conditions, subject to the 
constraint that the derivative of the polynomial function be non-negative. However, 
using polynomials that are monotonic by construction allows for the same 
unconstrained optimization methods to be used without extra feasibility iterations. All 
control variables (coefficients of the parameterized strategies) will result in a solution 
to the constrained problem that is, at the very least, a feasible solution to the 




find a solution to the system of first order conditions with a given tolerance, using 
monotonic polynomials ensures that the closest solution we can find is theoretically 
feasible, and so provides a good model of behavior. 
In addition, the use of monotonic polynomials avoids some of the numerical 
issues associated with “regular” polynomials. Although high-order monotonic 
polynomials can still overfit simulated data, the problems of non-monotonicity are of 
course eliminated, which causes the polynomials to hold shape much better near the 
extremes of the support.  
Finally, “cold starts” to the algorithm are easier to implement with monotonic 
polynomials. When selecting a starting value for a set of strategy parameters, the user 
typically needs to provide parameters that are reasonably close to the optimum – a 
“hot start.” An algorithm that relies on a hot start can be slow to converge with poor 
starting values. When the user has little information on which to base the choice of 
the initial parameters, a cold start can be performed instead – several potential starting 
values can be chosen randomly. When the coefficients of a regular polynomial are 
randomly chosen, many of the resulting strategies are likely to be non-monotonic, 
infeasible strategies. This problem is solved without any loss of flexibility by using 
monotonic polynomials. 
The construction of the monotonic polynomials uses a conflation method. Rather 
than the set of coefficients multiplying each power of the ordinary polynomial, the 
choice variables of the monotonic polynomial strategy are based on a fully factored 




fully factored version of the polynomial function, and then expand the expression to 
its most easily parameterized form.  
The construction of the monotonic polynomial strategies proceeds in two stages. 
First, we construct strictly positive polynomials, i.e. polynomials that never take on 
negative values. I denote these positive polynomials by ( )m′ i . In the second stage, a 
monotonically increasing polynomial is generated by integrating the positive 
polynomial. I denote the monotonic polynomial by ( )m i . The method derived below 
is due to Elphinstone (1983) and is implemented as part of the distribution of 
CSE_SOLVER. 
Constructing Positive Polynomials 
In this section I outline some defining characteristics of positive polynomials. 
These characteristics are used to generate a procedure for constructing positive 
polynomials. Our goal is to create a formula that can express any positive polynomial 
(and so is fully general), while never expressing a non-positive polynomial.  
Let 0 1, ,..., na a a  be a series of n coefficients. Notice that any and every 
polynomial in one variable can be expressed as ( ) 0
n j
jj
p x a x
=
= ∑ . We would like to 
derive a similarly flexible formula that can represent any positive polynomial, but that 
is incapable of expressing a non-positive polynomial.  
We are interested in creating a polynomial that is positive everywhere in a single 
variable (a bidder’s type). Since we are only interested in functions of one variable, it 
is helpful to think graphically. The most obvious characteristic of the graph of a 
positive polynomial in one variable is that it never crosses the x-axis. A polynomial 




condition that positive polynomials have no real solutions z  to the equation 
( ) 0p z = . Said another way, positive polynomials have no real roots. This is the first 
important characteristic that we will use in deriving a constructive representation of 
positive polynomials.  
We combine two basic results from the theory of algebra to derive the second 
important characteristic of positive polynomials. The two basic results are: (1) the 
fundamental theorem of algebra says that a polynomial of degree n has n roots24 and 
(2) if a polynomial has an odd number of roots, at least one root must be real.25 Since 
a positive polynomial has no real roots, we can conclude from (2) alone that a 
positive polynomial cannot have an odd number of roots. So, taken together, (1) and 
(2) imply that positive polynomials must be of even degree. That is, the highest power 
to which the argument x is raised must be an even number. To see why, the chain of 
logic proceeds as follows: (2) implies that any function without a real root must have 
an even number of roots and (1) implies that a polynomial with an even number of 
roots must itself be of even degree. As a result, we know that a positive polynomial 
can be constructed from paired terms. This way, the highest power to which x is 
raised will necessarily be divisible by two. Whereas a standard polynomial in one 
variable can be constructed by a simple summation formula, jjj a x∑ , a positive 
polynomial should be constructed from terms that appear in pairs,  i.e. 
( ) ( )1 2j jj x xϕ ϕ∑  where the pair 1 2,j jϕ ϕ  are some simple functions that always 
appear together. We turn next to the exact form of these paired terms. 
                                                 
24 That is, n solutions 1 2, ,..., nz z z  to the equation ( ) 0jp z = . These roots can be real or complex.  




We have thus far established two characteristics shared by all positive 
polynomials, the no-real-roots condition and the even-degree condition. To finally 
construct our first representation of a positive polynomial, realize that every 
polynomial26 can be represented in irreducible form by  
 ( )( ) ( )1 2 ... nx z x z x zλ − − − , (18) 
where λ  is a scalar constant, and again the letter z represents the roots of the 
polynomial. Said another way, every polynomial can be completely factored so that it 
can be expressed as a constant multiplied by a series of terms ( ) , 1,...,jx z j n− = , 
where each jz  is a root of the polynomial.  
We now collect our three facts. Since a polynomial is everywhere positive if and 
only if it has only complex roots, and these roots appear only in conjugate pairs, and 
every polynomial can be represented in irreducible form as in (18), then we can 
represent every strictly positive polynomial, ( )'m x , by a sequence of complex 
conjugate pairs multiplied together.  





m x x z x z
=
′ = λ − −∏ , (19) 
where λ  is a constant27, jz  is a complex root of ( )m x′ , and jz  is its conjugate. 
Complex numbers are made up of a real number α , plus an imaginary number i 
multiplied by another real number β . The conjugate is formed by changing the sign 
of the imaginary part. Plugging this representation into (19) we get  
                                                 
26 All polynomials can be represented this way, not just positive polynomials. See Binmore and Davies 
(2001), for example. 




 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1
k
j j j j
j
m x x i x iβ β
=
′ = λ − α + − α −∏ . (20) 
Equation (20) can be expanded and simplified to yield  






m x x x β
=
′ ⎡ ⎤= λ − α +α +⎣ ⎦∏ . (21) 
 Note that the imaginary part of the expression (19) has vanished entirely, which 
enables us to use (21) as the basis for a numerical representation of any positive 
polynomial.  
Since λ , { }1,..., kα = α α , and { }1,..., kβ β β=  are simply arbitrary constants, we 
can make some useful substitutions and represent (21) in an equivalent, but more 


















. Then  






m x xa x a b
=
⎡ ⎤′ = λ − + +⎣ ⎦∏  (22) 
is entirely equivalent to (21). This can be seen easily by substituting the 
definitions of ja  and jb  into (22).  
The equation (22) is superior to (21) because it has a structure that facilitates 
simple iterative calculations. One of the reasons polynomials are used so often to 
approximate unknown functions is because polynomials of degree n  are related in a 
straightforward way to polynomials of degree 1n + . For example, a polynomial 
( ) 22 0 1 2p x a a x a x= + +  is equal to ( ) 2 33 0 1 2 3p x a a x a x a x= + + +  when 3 0a = . 
Because of this, if we find that an unknown function is well-approximated by the 




polynomial using the starting values { }0 1 2, , ,0a a a . The standard representation of a 
general polynomial, ( )0 0; ,...,
n j
n n jj
p x a a a x
=
= ∑  has the property that 
( ) ( )0 1 0; ,..., ; ,..., ,0n n n np x a a p x a a+= ; equation (22) also has this property. To 
calculate a positive polynomial of degree 2, we set 1k = . To calculate a positive 
polynomial of degree 4, we set 2k = ; the values 1a  and 1b  can be used as starting 
values. 
Constructing Monotonic Polynomials 
In this section I show how to group the estimated coefficients of the positive 
polynomial ( )m x′  in order to make integration by the power rule straightforward. 
This enables construction of the monotonic polynomial ( ) ( )m x m t dt′= ∫ . The task is 
conceptually simple, but is difficult to reduce to a reasonable number of steps (so that 
the number of computer operations does not grow too quickly as we increase k ). If 
the expansion of (22) resulted in an expression like  
 ( ) 1 20 1 2 ... kk km x D D x D x D x′ = + + + + , 
such that the coefficient Dτ  multiplied x  to the power τ , then we could obtain 
( )km x  by a simple application of the power rule  
 ( ) ( )
2 12 3
21 2




D xD x D xm x m x D x
k
+
′= = + + + +
+∫ . 
The expansion of (22) is unfortunately quite a bit messier. As it stands, the terms 
multiplying each successive power of x  are a combination of the parameters 




the same power of x  computationally simple. To collect terms, I introduce some new 
notation.  
 Since (22) is calculated iteratively, we can write any given positive 
polynomial as a product of 1k +  terms  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 ...k km x m x q x q x q x′ ′= , (23) 
where ( )0m x′ = λ  is the value of the positive polynomial when 0k = , and each 
term ( )jq x  represents the bracketed term in (22), i.e.  
 ( ) ( )2 2 21 2j j j jq x xa x a b⎡ ⎤= − + +⎣ ⎦ . (24) 
Let the term multiplying 0x  inside the brackets in (24) be denoted ( )0
jd , the term 
multiplying 1x  be denoted ( )1
jd , and the term multiplying 2x  be denoted ( )2
jd . Then 
we can rewrite (22) as  





m x d d x d x
=























We can now see that for 2k =  we have 
 
( )' (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 22 0 0 0 1 0 2
(1) (2) (1) (2) 2 (1) (2) 3
1 0 1 1 1 2
(1) (2) 2 (1) (2) 3 (1) (2) 4
2 0 2 1 2 2
[
         
         ]
m x d d d d x d d x
d d x d d x d d x
d d x d d x d d x
= λ + + +






Note that there are three separate sets of coefficients multiplying 2x : (1) (2)0 2d d , 
(1) (2)
1 1d d , and 
(1) (2)
2 0d d . We want to collect terms so that we can express ( )2m x′ , a 
fourth degree polynomial, in terms of just five coefficients. Notice that the sole 
coefficient multiplying x  to the power τ  is the sum of all m nd d  such that m n τ+ = . 
We can collect terms so that we can express ( )2m x′  in the desired form  








(2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
1 0 1 1 0
(2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
2 0 2 1 1 2 0
(2) (1) (2) (1) (2)




D d d d d
D d d d d d d








In this case, we accomplished the grouping of terms by simple inspection. We 
would like to express the coefficients such that the grouping of terms was 
"automatic".  
By expressing the coefficients in matrix form, we accomplish our goal of 
grouping terms during the construction of the positive polynomial. Let ( )kDτ  represent 
the sole coefficient multiplying x  to the power τ  of a positive polynomial of degree 
2k  (recall that the degree of the positive polynomial is twice k , since the formula 
(22) always yields polynomials of even degree). Examining the first few values of k  
reveals a simple pattern.  
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(2) (1)(2) (2) (2) (2)











D DD d d d
DD d d
D d
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⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟




(1)(2) (2) (2) (1) (2) (1)
01 0 1 0 0 1
(1)(2) (2) (2) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1)
12 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 2
(1)(2) (2) (2) (1) (2) (1)
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For a polynomial of degree 2k , the single coefficient on 0x  is constructed by 
multiplying the "new" coefficient ( )0
kd  by the single coefficient on 0x  in a polynomial 
of degree ( )2 1k − . The single coefficient on 1x  is constructed by summing two 
terms: (1) multiply the coefficient ( )1




polynomial of degree ( )2 1k − ; (2) multiply the coefficient ( )0kd  by the single 
coefficient on 1x  in a polynomial of degree ( )2 1k − . The pattern continues. 
Combinations of the "new" coefficients are multiplied by all existing terms from a 
lower-degree polynomial to create new terms. 
Utilizing this matrix representation, we can calculate the sole coefficients 
multiplying all powers of x , i.e. powers 0,..., 2k , using just k  matrix operations. 
This representation makes integrating the positive polynomial computationally 
simple, and allows us to generate any monotonic polynomial using the coefficients 













+∑ . (28) 
Estimating G and g 
I use three different techniques to estimate the distribution and density of the 
marginal bid. As suggested by Armantier (2006), I have implemented an estimation 
strategy based on orthogonal polynomials. Armantier suggests using orthogonal 
polynomials because of their speed. However, I have found that a strategy combining 
kernel methods and interpolation to be just as fast, and much more accurate in most 
cases. Finally, I have implemented a target distribution method which, although 
slower to calculate than either orthogonal polynomials or kernel methods, can provide 
smoother estimates. Because the target distribution method sacrifices speed for 




following sections, I will briefly discuss orthogonal and kernel estimation methods, 
and discuss the target distribution method in slightly more detail. 
Orthogonal Series Method 
The unknown density of the critical bid, ( )g i , can be nonparametrically 
estimated by  






g x w x a xϕ
=
= ∑ , 
where ( )w x  is a weighting function, ˆka  are coefficient weights to be estimated, 
and ( )k xϕ  are functions chosen to be mutually orthonormal with respect to the 
weighting function ( )w x . The functions ( )k xϕ  are mutually orthonormal if the 
following two conditions hold: 












(ii.) ( )0 1xϕ = . 
There are several families of polynomials that can serve as the ϕ  family of 
functions. Among them are Legendre, Chebyshev, Laguerre, and Hermite 
polynomials. Legendre polynomials have the particularly attractive property that the 
weighting function that causes condition (i.) to hold is simply ( ) 1w x = . The 
coefficient weights are estimated by  
 ( )
1












The advantage of estimating density functions by orthogonal polynomials is that 
an estimate of the density at any given point x can be calculated without calculating 
the density at all other points – that is, the estimation is entirely local. In addition, 
orthogonal polynomials can be computed by a recurrence relation, which makes 
computation numerically attractive. The number of computations needed to arrive at 
an estimate is relatively small. Additionally, since we need to carryout out MC 
instances of the auction in order to determine the winner, we need to do very few 
additional calculations in order to estimate ˆka . 
The technique is not without its drawbacks. Although the procedure of estimating 
a density function on a compact interval is simple and computationally attractive, the 
estimate is not necessarily smooth. As opposed to kernel methods, density estimates 
using the orthogonal series technique can only be smoothed by increasing the Monte 
Carlo size or the degree of the approximating polynomial, and the optimal degree of 
the polynomial approximation is difficult to determine.28  
Kernel Method 







x xg x K
MC h h=
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⋅ ⎝ ⎠
∑ , 
where h is a bandwidth parameter, K is the kernel function, and 
1 2{ , ,..., }MCx x x are the observed data. The kernel function can be any function; 
popular choices are the normal pdf, the triangle pdf, or the epanechnikov pdf. As the 
                                                 
28 The approximation by orthogonal polynomials converges to the true function as n →∞ . For 
practical purposes, n needs to be large enough such that the difference between successive orthogonal 
coefficients is small. The value of n necessary to provide an accurate estimate of the unknown function 




preceding list makes clear, the kernel function itself is often a probability density 
function, but this is not required.29 
Target Distribution Method 
The target distribution method is based on a simple premise. Every two 
continuous distribution functions ( )G i  and ( )H i  are related by at least one 
transformation function ( )t i  such that ( ) ( )( )G x H t x= .30 Suppose G is the unknown 
distribution function we wish to estimate. We can then select H , the target 
distribution, and estimate G by ( )( )ˆH t x . By estimating the transformation function 
and fixing the target distribution, we obtain an estimate of the unknown distribution 
Ĝ  that (i) incorporates any prior information we may possess as to the form of the 
true distribution that generated our data, (ii) incorporates information on the support 
of the distribution, and (iii) is sufficiently flexible to provide excellent performance 
even when the target distribution is chosen poorly. 
The target distribution method is nonparametric in the sense that no assumption 
is made as to the form of G. On the other hand, we do place restrictions on H in order 
to ensure that our estimate Ĝ  is itself a distribution function, and that the same 
procedure yields ˆĝ dG= , an estimate of the density that has all the properties of a 
p.d.f.  
                                                 
29 See Turlach (1993) and Härdle and Linton (1994) for details on properties of the kernel and 
desirable selection criteria. 




Since H is selected to be a continuous distribution, ( )( )H t x  is a distribution so 
long as ( )t x  is monotonically increasing. Therefore, ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )'d H t x h t x t x
dx
=  is a 
well-behaved probability density function, again so long as ( )t x  is monotonically 
increasing. 
As H is fixed and G is unknown, the computation necessary to carry out the 
target method reduces to finding an appropriate estimate ( )t̂ x . The estimate must be: 
(i) monotonically increasing and (ii) sufficiently flexible to estimate the true ( )t x . 
Using an unrestricted polynomial to estimate ( )t x  is tempting, as the Weierstrass 
theorem tells us that ( )t x  can be estimated to any desired degree of accuracy with a 
polynomial over a closed interval. However, it is also well known that the best 
approximation of a monotonically increasing function is not necessarily itself a 
monotonically increasing function. That is, an unrestricted polynomial fits 
requirement (ii), but not requirement (i). This was Elphinstone’s original motivation 
for the procedure to generate monotonic polynomials by conflation, which I outlined 
above.  
The CSE Solution in Benchmark Cases  
First-price auction with uniformly distributed values  
Probably the most well known sealed-bid auction model is the first-price 




microeconomics or introductory game theory text will include analysis of this auction 
model. The unique equilibrium bidding function is well known to be  




The Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is a linear function of the value draw x. Thus in 
this case, the CSE of the auction problem is exactly identical to the unconstrained 
BNE.  
We will solve this auction posed as a CSE problem when N = 2. Doing so will 
provide a great deal of insight into how the algorithm works, and demonstrates the 
accuracy of the CSE algorithm in a basic case.  
Restricting ourselves to a simple linear function, recall that the first order 
condition of the CSE problem from the perspective of bidder 1 can be written: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
; ; ; ; 0d s x a x s x a g s x a G s x a
da
− − = . (14) 
When ( )1 1 1 1;s x a a x= , ( )1 1 1
1
;d s x a x
da
=  and the first order condition can be expressed 
as 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1; ; 0x x a x g s x a G s x a− − = . 
In a symmetric equilibrium, 1 2a a a= = , and the analytical expressions for g and 
G are 1
a
 and x , respectively. Substituting in, we get: 
 ( ) 1 0x x ax x
a
⎛ ⎞− − =⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
. 
Figure 1 illustrates the approach (and the challenge) of trying to find an 




first order condition for all values of x ( [ ]0,1x∈ ), evaluated at candidate solutions for 
the linear coefficient a between 0 and the BNE value of 0.5. The coefficient a is 
represented on the front-facing (left-to-right) axis, and the values x are represented on 
the right-facing (front-to-back) axis. The optimal (BNE) coefficient is located at the 
far right of edge of the 3D plot. The value of the first order condition is zero for all 
values of x along the right edge of the graph. As a decreases (along the front-facing 
axis, a decreases from right-to-left) the first order condition diverges from zero for 
values of 0x > , with the magnitude of the first order condition increasing in x.  
Figure 1 shows the value of the first order condition for all possible values of x.  
It is the average value, however, of the first order condition we are evaluating with 
the Monte Carlo technique. The average of the first order condition will be 0 at the 
BNE coefficient *a , since in equilibrium the value of (14) is 0 for every x. The 
average value of the first order condition is plotted in Figure 2. That is, the front-to-
back axis in Figure 1 is collapsed by averaging all values along a “slice” of Figure 1 
for a fixed value of a. This produces a single line representing the value of the first 
order condition as a increases from left to right. Starting from 1a =  (bid = value), the 
first order condition approaches zero smoothly from below.  
The following Mathematica code generates Figure 1and Figure 2. 















Figure 1 – Analytical FOCs of a buy-auction 
 
 
Figure 2 – Average FOCs as a varies 











The approximation of the distribution and density functions G and g introduces 
Monte Carlo error into this procedure. All the simulation error we get is generated by 
the difference between the Monte Carlo estimates ĝ  and Ĝ  and their true values 1
a
 




methods and a Monte Carlo size of 1e4, and plots the value of the first order 
condition for potential coefficients a over the range of x. 
% Set the pseudo-random number stream for replicability. 
stream = RandStream('mrg32k3a'); 
RandStream.setDefaultStream(stream); 
stream.Substream = 1; 
  
% Evaluate the FOC at even intervals over the domain of x. 
x1 = (0:0.01:1)'; 
% Evaluate the FOC for all feasible values of the coefficient a. 
a = 0.2:0.01:1; 
% Draw random numbers for bidder 2. This is the Monte Carlo sample. 
x2 = random('unif',0,1,1e4,1); 
% Form a grid of the data for 3D plot. 
[A1,X1] = meshgrid(a,x1); 
[A2,X2] = meshgrid(a,x2); 
% Bids of bidder 2. 
B2 = A2.*X2; 
% Make container arrays for the density and distribution. 
PDF = zeros(size(A1)); 
CDF = zeros(size(A1)); 
% Fill in the density and distribution. 
for i = 1:1:size(X1,2) 
    PDF(:,i) = ksdensity(B2(:,i),X1(:,i).*A2(1,i),... 
        'support',[0 A2(1,i)],'function','pdf'); 
    CDF(:,i) = ksdensity(B2(:,i),X1(:,i).*A2(1,i),... 
        'support',[0 A2(1,i)],'function','cdf'); 
end 
% Evaluate the FOC. 
FOC = X1.*((X1 - A1.*X1).*PDF - CDF); 
% Exclude values of x very close to 1 due to numerical instability. 
X1(98:101,:) = []; A1(98:101,:) = []; FOC(98:101,:) = []; 






axis([0 1 0 1 -2 2]) 
 
The result of the code is displayed in Figure 3. The approximation of the first 
order condition appears to be quite good, although some numerical problems are 
hidden here by the exclusion of points x close to 1 (see Figure 6 and the discussion 
below). The approximate solution can be seen by tracing the line of light green across 




Figure 3 – Simulated FOCs of a buy-auction 
 
 
In order to see the surface corresponding to a = 0.5 (the equivalent of the right 
edge of Figure 1) we look at Figure 4, which stops at a = 0.5 to isolate the slice of 
Figure 3 along that edge. We can see that at the BNE solution, the value of the 
simulated first order condition is very near to zero (colored in red).  
% Plot the FOC over all values of (x,a) s.t. a <= 0.5. 
surf(X1(:,1:31),A1(:,1:31),FOC(:,1:31)) 
xlabel('x'  ,'FontSize',16) 
ylabel('a'  ,'FontSize',16) 
zlabel('foc','FontSize',16) 
colormap hsv 





Figure 4 – Simulated FOCs of a buy-auction (focused) 
 
 
Once again, we collapse the surface by averaging over the x-values for a given 
value of the coefficient a. The results are shown in Figure 5.  
% Figure 5 -- Average of the x-values at a = 0.5. 
avgfoc = mean(FOC,1); 
plot(A1(1,:),avgfoc); hold on; 







Figure 5 – Simulated average FOCs as a varies 



















The constrained equilibrium solution is actually found to be 0.4964 based on a 
grid search with step size 0.0001. The simulation error of 0.0036 is mostly due to 
errors in the estimation of the density of the winning bid g, and these errors are 
mostly clustered at the upper end of the range of x values. The disturbance for values 
when x is close to 1 can be seen in the front of Figure 4, where there appears to be a 
wave along the leading edge of the FOC surface. 
% What is the exact minimum? Is it at a = 0.5? 
% Do a very fine grid search. 
a = 0.45:0.0001:0.55; 
x1 = (0:0.01:1)'; 
[A1,X1] = meshgrid(a,x1); 
[A2,X2] = meshgrid(a,x2); 
B2 = A2.*X2; 
PDF = zeros(size(A1)); 
CDF = zeros(size(A1)); 
for i = 1:1:size(X1,2) 
    PDF(:,i) = ksdensity(B2(:,i),X1(:,i).*A2(1,i),... 
        'support',[0 A2(1,i)],'function','pdf'); 
    CDF(:,i) = ksdensity(B2(:,i),X1(:,i).*A2(1,i),... 
        'support',[0 A2(1,i)],'function','cdf'); 
end 
FOC = X1.*((X1 - A1.*X1).*PDF - CDF); 
avgfoc = mean(FOC(1:96,:),1); 




trueMin = A1(1,minindx); 
% Result --> 0.4965. 
 
Taking a closer look: the following MATLAB code examines in greater detail the 
slice of the surface in Figure 4 when a = 0.5. It is instructive to examine the 
estimation of g and G at this point, as it illustrates the difficulty of accurately 
estimating the distribution of a bid on a compact support. The result of this exercise is 
shown in Figure 6.  
% Estimate G and g for the BNE coefficient a = 1/2. 
% Set coefficient a = 0.5; 
a = 0.5; 
% Form bids for bidder 2. 
b2 = a*x2; 
% Estimate density. 
[pdf xi] = ksdensity(b2,'support',[0,1*a],'function','pdf'); 
% Estimate distribution. 
[cdf xi] = ksdensity(b2,'support',[0,1*a],'function','cdf'); 
% Plot both pdf and cdf. 
[ax,h1,h2] = plotyy([xi' xi'],[pdf' (ones(size(xi))/(1/2))'],... 




legend(h1,'PDF Estimate','PDF Actual','Location',[0.2,0.65 0.05 
0.01]) 





title('Kernel Estimates: Pr(win|bid)') 
% Note that you may need to re-size the graphics window in order for 





Figure 6 – Kernel Estimates: Pr(win|bid) 













































The estimate of G is quite good over the entire range of x, so much so that 
estimated points overlay and obscure the true value of the CDF. The estimate of g is 
less precise. Nonparametric methods are in a way “local” – the value of a density 
estimate at a given point draws on nearby data. Points near either end of a compact 
support necessarily have fewer data points within a given window, since no data 
appears above (below) the upper (lower) endpoint of the distribution. I have found 
instability near the endpoints of the support of bids using both kernel methods and 
orthogonal polynomials. Using these estimates of the PDF and CDF of bidder 2’s bid, 
we can evaluate the first order condition at evenly spaced intervals over the domain of 
x. 
% Evaluate the first order condition at values along x. 
x1 = (0:0.01:1)'; 
b2 = 0.5*x2; 
g = ksdensity(b2,0.5*x1,'support',[0 0.5],'function','pdf'); 
G = ksdensity(b2,0.5*x1,'support',[0 0.5],'function','cdf'); 







Figure 7 – FOC over x for a = 0.5 (BNE). 


















The instability of ĝ  as 0x →  has no visible influence on the estimated first 
order condition displayed in Figure 7. The estimation error in that region is 
overwhelmed by the small values of ( )( )1 1 1;x s x a− , the gain from winning the 
auction, in the first order condition (14). As 0x → , notice that ( )1 1 1;s x a x→  (see the 
equilibrium bidding function in Figure 8) and so the term multiplying g becomes 
extremely small. On the other hand, the estimation error in ĝ  as 1x →  has a 
significant impact on the first order condition, which can be seen clearly in Figure 7. 
The profit from winning the auction in this region is relatively large, meaning that 
estimation errors in ĝ  are amplified. For this reason, we exclude from our 
calculations values of the first order condition as x approaches the upper (lower) end 
of its support in a buy- (sell-) auction.  
Figure 8 – BNE bid function 












The MMRS coalition vs. coalition model  
The MMRS coalition-vs-coalition model can be estimated by the CSE technique, 
and the solutions from the two competing algorithms can be compared. The 
components of the model are as follows. There are 5 total bidders (n = 5); two 
coalitions form, where the first coalition is either of size 4 or 3 (the second coalition 
is either of size (1 or 2); draws of value are from the uniform [0,1]; a coalition bids 
according to its highest value (i.e. a coalition of 3 individuals behaves as if its value is 
the highest among its three individual draws). 
We will focus here on a single case of the MMRS model. The MMRS algorithm 
with coalitions of size 4 and 1 produces the bidding functions represented in Figure 9 
(originally appearing as Figure 1A in Marshall, et al. (1994) and reproduced here with 
permission from Elsevier – see appendix). The same model, submitted to 
CSE_SOLVER, gives the results displayed in Figure 10. 






Figure 10 – CSE bidding functions in MMRS coalition model 
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You can see in Figure 10 that the bidding functions arrived at by the CSE 
algorithm are nearly equal to those of MMRS. Figure 11 makes the near-equivalence 
more apparent by overlaying the two plots, showing just how close the two 
techniques are. The two figures have been overlaid using Mathematica, which allows 
the plots to be manipulated onto the same scale. I have stretched the CSE plot so that 
the aspect ratio matches as nearly as possible the exact dimensions of the original 




Figure 11 – MMRS/CSE bidding functions overlaid 










The CSE procedure does not quite match the MMRS estimates, which are 
reported accurate to 6 to 8 digits.31 The CSE procedure can be improved, however, by 
imposing the added condition that ( ) ( )1 21; 1;s s=a a , the condition that MMRS 
algorithm relies on for convergence. This condition is imposed simply by restricting 
one of the four coefficients (the choice of which one is arbitrary) needed to estimate a 
quadratic CSE. We simply choose one of the coefficients, in this case we fix the 
coefficient on the second squared-term, and solve the identity: 
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11 12{ , , }a a a , and will be arrived at by solving a system of three 
                                                 
31 The accuracy measure quoted here refers to the estimate of the bid of each coalition when the type 




equations. The modification needed to implement this procedure in CSE_SOLVER is 
straightforward. The result of running the restricted CSE model is shown in Figure 
12. The overlay of the two plots is nearly perfect.32  
Figure 12 – MMRS/ Restricted CSE bidding functions overlaid 









Notes: The CSE bidding function of the coalition of 4 is given by 
0.3286x + 0.3053x^2, while the CSE bidding function of the coalition 
of 1 is given by 0.9116x - 0.2778x^2. 
 
The important question is whether or not the difference between the CSE 
estimates and the more exact MMRS solutions are economically meaningful. For the 
coalition model replicated above, MMRS report the auctioneer’s expected revenue 
and bidders’ expected per-capita surplus. The exact values reported in MMRS are 
compared to the CSE results in Table 1 below. The auctioneer’s expected revenue and 
                                                 
32 Using the same measure of accuracy given in MMRS, the restricted CSE method is within 0.0035 of 
the MMRS estimate of the upper support of the distribution of bids. The estimate of the upper support, 
denoted by *t , is given in Table 1 on page 204 of MMRS. I subtract from that value the figure 
0.63385650948398442, which is the bid of a bidder with a type draw of 1 using the coefficients given 




the per-capita surplus of the coalition bidders are estimated identically to at least 3 
significant digits. The improvement in per-capita surplus from optimal unilateral 
deviation is less than 1.5% for both coalitions. The profitability of optimal deviation 
from the CSE strategies is extremely low.  















Chapter 4: Asymmetric Multi-Unit Auctions with a 
Quota 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we use the CSE approach to study asymmetric procurement 
auctions wherein sellers from two classes draw costs from different distributions. 
When sellers are asymmetric, a cost-minimizing buyer discriminates among classes 
of sellers to enhance competition (Myerson (1981)). Establishing quota—a limit on 
the number of offers that can be accepted from any one class—discriminates simply 
and effectively. A binding quota increases demand scarcity from the perspective of 
low-cost sellers, which causes them to lower their offers. The CSE approach is used 
to solve for the equilibrium strategies of asymmetric auctions with and without a 
quota, and we find a quota enhances competition and lowers total procurement cost. 
The quota we impose are similar to mechanisms used widely in practice. In 
government procurement of construction contracts, for example, “set asides” are used 
to reserve some contracts for minority-owned and small businesses, effectively 
placing quota on the number of contracts available for non-minority-owned or large 
businesses. Because the mechanism is widely used to promote social goals and can 
also lead to better outcomes for the buyer, our findings have both positive and 
normative implications. 
When sellers are asymmetric, the optimal auction is one that discriminates 
between sellers (Myerson (1981), Bulow and Roberts (1989)). While the conditions 




remains an open issue. How might a procuring agent, knowing that sellers are 
observably different in their ability to produce a good, structure an auction that 
accounts for this asymmetry? Direct implementation of the optimal auction requires 
that the procuring agent have knowledge of the distribution of seller costs and the 
ability to discriminate perfectly between sellers. Since neither of these two conditions 
is likely to be met in practice, we investigate the returns to a simple mechanism that a 
buyer can easily implement. The mechanism imposes a quota, a limit on the number 
of winning offers that can come from any single class of sellers, to increase 
competition within that class. That is, the auctioneer specifies ex ante that he will 
accept no more than x offers from a defined class of sellers.  
We find motivation to study simple price discriminating methods in many 
practical applications. Private firms engage in contract procurement using auctions. 
Every level of government procures goods from suppliers that are observably 
heterogeneous in some way. Popular examples include defense-related procurement, 
procurement of infrastructure contracts, and procurement of fleet vehicles. The 
federal government also procures environmental services from heterogeneous private 
landowners using an auction procedure.33 A mechanism that encourages competition 
through discrimination could also exist in markets with less structure than a formal 
auction. Firms, for example, hire from heterogeneous labor pools. Firms cannot 
perfectly discriminate between workers, and so must pay some workers more than 
their reservation wage (Ayres and Cramton (1996)).  
                                                 
33 Although many similar programs exist, the largest single example of what are known as 
conservation auctions is the Conservation Reserve Program implemented by the U.S. Department of 




What we refer to as a quota is similar to what some in the auction literature call 
set-asides. When multiple units of a good are being auctioned by the government 
(whether they be items to be sold or contracts to be purchased), set-asides reserve 
some number to be won by qualified bidders. Qualified bidders are bidders selected 
based on observable characteristics, often race or business size, meant in most cases 
to promote social goals, such as encouraging participation by a minority class of 
bidders (Denes (1997)). Milgrom (2004) presents a simple example of how set-asides 
can increase competition in an auction and so enhance the auction outcome from the 
bid-taker’s perspective.34 The fact that set-asides are used both in the sale of public 
goods such as spectrum (Ayres and Cramton (1996)), and in government 
procurement, provides a positive motivation for our study. That is, in addition to or 
despite possible social goals, governments or firms may use set-asides to reduce 
procurement costs. 
Quotas reduce procurement costs when sellers of several dissimilar classes 
compete to sell multiple goods.35 Sellers compete against rivals both similar and 
dissimilar to themselves. Sellers from these dissimilar classes, having observable 
characteristics that distinguish them, will offer toward a common margin. This 
margin is set by a mix of within-class and between-class competition. When one class 
of sellers has lower opportunity costs than another, a quota enhances within-class 
competition. The intuition is straightforward: by limiting the number of winning 
                                                 
34 Milgrom’s example (of a forward auction, as opposed to a reverse, or procurement, auction) is 
particularly simple in that the distribution of bidder values does not overlap. Thus the high-value 
bidders in his example always win all the goods in an auction without set-asides. Our examples are 
more general, as we allow for cost distributions to overlap. 
35 Similarly, in an auction to sell (rather than procure) multiple items, a seller would benefit from quota 




offers, demand from that group declines. The artificial scarcity makes offers more 
competitive. The tradeoff is that between-class competition is sacrificed: when a low-
cost seller is eliminated, high-cost sellers face less competition.  
McAfee and McMillan (1989) provide an example in a context of international 
trade, which we modify slightly for our own purposes. There are six firms, two 
foreign and low-cost and four domestic and high-cost, competing for two government 
contracts. Unrestricted competition is characterized by weak competition within the 
class of low-cost foreign firms. The marginal foreign firm competes with domestic 
firms to fulfill the second contract, while the stronger foreign firm extracts substantial 
rents. McAfee and McMillan investigate how price preferences influence the 
procurement cost of an auction. If a quota were imposed that mandated a maximum 
of one foreign and one domestic firm to fulfill the government’s need, the low-cost 
foreign firms would be forced to compete directly with each other. Rent that would 
have been extracted by low-cost foreign firms is reduced while rent accruing to 
domestic firms increases. The net effect of a quota depends on the net balance of 
offsetting influences: low-cost foreign firms face tougher competition, while high-
cost domestic firms inflate their offers in the absence of direct foreign competition. In 
this polar example, quota has effectively created two separate auctions, one in which 
only foreign firms compete, and one in which only domestic firms compete.  
The total effect of a quota on procurement cost is the sum of enhanced 
competition within classes and reduced competition between classes. A quota is thus 
most beneficial to the buyer when within-class competition is low among low-cost 




cost class. In single-price auction without the restriction of a quota, what we will refer 
to as an “open” auction, sellers from the low-cost class will offer toward the same 
margin as sellers from the high-cost class and thereby extract substantial rents. 
Setting a quota effectively reduces the surplus captured by low-cost sellers. 
While the idea of discriminating among sellers was laid out in the seminal paper 
on optimal auctions (Myerson (1981)), the method of discrimination considered here 
is new in important ways. Most auction papers focusing on implementation of a 
discriminating policy have examined what are known as bid preferences, a 
discounting of offers for the sole purpose of determining winners. For example, bid 
preferences in auctions for the procurement of transportation contracts in California 
take the following form (Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2009); Marion (2009)). A 
qualified “small bidder” wins a contract so long as its offer is within 5% of the lowest 
offer by an unqualified seller. Such a preference could be formulated as an actual 
discount to the qualified offer for the purposes of evaluation only (Hubbard and 
Paarsch (2009)). That is, the bid-taker will rank discounted offers, equal to (1-
preference) × offer, from lowest-to-highest, selecting the lowest discounted offer as 
the winning offer and paying the winning seller their full undiscounted offer. Such 
bid preference programs are common in government procurement (Hubbard and 
Paarsch (2009)), and have been applied in high stakes auctions such as the first 
auctions for spectrum in the United States (Ayres and Cramton (1996)). Bid 
preferences are also used in, for example, procurement for snow contracts (Flambard 
and Perrigne (2006)), and have been studied in experimental settings (Corns and 




some positive bid preference, so long as the bid preference does not inhibit 
participation by strong sellers.36  
Perhaps because most auction research in the area of bid discrimination considers 
single-unit auctions, set-asides and quotas, which apply only to multi-unit auctions, 
have received less study. In a multi-unit context quota neatly handles a problem 
inherent to the preference approach. To implement a price-preference mechanism, the 
auctioneer must know which class of sellers is low-cost and which are high-cost, and 
also have a good understanding of cost differences between classes. Such information 
is not necessary with quota. There are many applications, such as auctions for 
conservation land, when the auctioneer is less likely to know which class is low-cost 
and which is high-cost but nevertheless expects costs to differ widely across classes. 
In this case, providing a bid preference to the wrong party could increase 
procurement cost. On the other hand, a quota can be used by the bid-taker to 
encourage competition, even if the bid-taker is not able to identify which group of 
sellers is relatively low-cost, and which group of sellers is relatively high-cost. The 
bid-taker could always place a binding limit on the number of bids from any one 
group that can be accepted. Note that to enforce this rule, the bid-taker need not be 
able to identify which group of sellers is relatively low-cost. The only requirement is 
that the sellers themselves be aware of this fact. 
Our research applies quota in an independent private values (IPV) model of a 
one-shot, sealed-bid auction. Since our focus is on procurement, we model a pay-as-
bid auction as opposed to a uniform price auction. Almost all government 
                                                 
36 We do not analyze the effect on participation of imposing a quota. Since there is no participation 
cost in our model, we assume that each potential bidder will find it in their interest to submit a bid, 




procurement auctions use the pay-as-bid format. Thus our analysis differs from that 
of Ayres and Cramton (1996), who investigate bid preferences and set-asides in 
multiple-round, open-bid auctions, and from Denes (1997), who studies multiple 
auctions over time.  
In the next section, we construct a simple two-class model of a procurement 
auction for multiple goods. We examine a number of special cases to illustrate how 
large differences in opportunity cost between classes of sellers can lead to low levels 
of within-class competition. We then estimate bidding functions in these cases using 
the CSE approach to computation. 
Model 
Suppose there are two classes of sellers. Type A Sellers draw their costs from 
distribution AF , while Type B sellers draw their costs from distribution BF . There 
are N total sellers, An  Type A sellers, and likewise Bn  Type B. The fact that there are 
An  Type A sellers and Bn  Type B sellers is common knowledge to all, including the 
bid-taker. However, it is only required that sellers know the characteristics of AF  and 
BF , while the buyer may remain ignorant of these characteristics.  
Type A sellers draw their costs, c , independently from a distribution AF  on 
support ,A Ac c⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  and Type B sellers draw their costs from a distribution 
BF  on 
support ,B Bc c⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . The distribution 
BF  is constructed from distribution AF  by an 
additive parameter δ . This captures the simplest type of class asymmetry – sellers 




sellers perceive the other group as similar to themselves but with a different average 
cost (sellers are ex ante high-cost or low-cost).  
Consider the problem from the perspective of an arbitrary seller (say seller 1). 
The buyer will accept the lowest m  of the offers submitted by the N  sellers, so the 
probability of a given offer being accepted is the probability that the offer is below 
the thm  lowest of all the other offers. Each seller submits a single offer.  
This is the form of the basic model. We will use this model to investigate how 
procurement cost, and the rent accruing to sellers, increases as within-class 
competition decreases. To do so, and to provide quantitative predictions for our 
laboratory experiment, we must derive bidding functions for our model.  
Symmetric Sellers  
Let 1 2 1, ,..., NY Y Y −  represent the cost draws of each of the 1N − sellers that are not 
seller 1, ordered from lowest-to-highest. The unique symmetric equilibrium bidding 
strategy of the auction when 0δ = is 
 ( ) [ ]|M Mx E Y Y xβ = > . 
PROOF: See Weber (1983) or Ortega-Reichert (1968). 
The intuition behind this result is simple. A seller facing 1N −  competitors that 
are ex ante identical will submit an offer just low enough to be among the m  lowest. 
If the equilibrium is symmetric, i.e. every seller follows the same strategy, only those 
sellers with the lowest m  cost draws will be accepted. Therefore, each seller forms 
their expectations of what the thm  lowest cost draw will be, conditional on it being 




With the analytic bid functions given in the proposition, expected procurement 
cost is easily seen to be [ ]mm E Ci  where mC  is the thm  lowest amongst all N  cost 
draws.37  
Uniquely in the symmetric case we can derive an analytic solution to the 
equilibrium bidding function. Since our main interest is in investigating auctions with 
asymmetric sellers, we will need to introduce the CSE technique for estimating 
bidding functions.  
Asymmetric Sellers 
The sharp prediction of behavior and total procurement cost holds only when all 
sellers are identical ( 0δ = ). When we consider asymmetric classes of sellers, there is 
no single strategy that sellers from both groups will follow in equilibrium. Solving for 
equilibrium bidding functions when sellers are asymmetric is notoriously difficult 
(Gayle and Richard (2008)). Rather than relax the assumption of asymmetry, we use 
the CSE algorithm discussed in chapters 2 and 3 to compute equilibrium strategies. 
Considering constrained strategies often proves advantageous in two ways. First, by 
constraining the strategy space we can solve auction models that would otherwise 
prove intractable. Second, strategies that are simple functions of a seller’s private 
information often prove to be more useful predictors of actual behavior than Nash 
predictions (Kagel and Richard 2001). Since some of the predicted bidding functions 
presented here will be tested in the lab, it is important to note this as-yet unmentioned 
benefit of the constrained approach. 
                                                 
37 This is the thm  order statistic from N  draws and is distinct from what was denoted by mY  in the 
proposition. mY  denoted the 




The CSE approach has another benefit. When a BNE does not exist, we can 
approximate likely outcomes by finding strategies that form a near-equilibrium. That 
is, we can identify strategies that lead to a situation where the incentives for any one 
seller to deviate are extremely low. The requirement for a BNE is, of course, that 
unilateral deviation be unprofitable. A constrained strategic equilibrium is one in 
which the expected profit from deviation is made arbitrarily small. 
By restricting attention to strategies that follow a particular functional form, we 
are able to estimate bidding strategies numerically. We present here a more detailed 
explanation of the program only in the linear case, but the extension to polynomial 
strategies is straightforward, and has been reviewed at length in chapters 2 and 3. We 
attempt to find the best coefficient a , given the assumption that every seller restricts 
themselves to linear strategies, and that every seller in a group implements the 
same a . For an arbitrary Type A seller, this amounts to maximizing the offer net of 
costs, multiplied by the probability that the offer is accepted. This is given by 
  ( ) ( )A i i A ia c c G a c− , (29) 
whereG is the distribution of the critical offer, the offer above which no offers will be 
accepted. Note that the critical offer may be submitted by a member of either 
group A or group B , so specifyingG analytically not a simple matter. To find the 
optimal Aa , we differentiate to obtain first order condition 




where g  is the derivative of G . By doing likewise from the perspective of an 
arbitrary Type B seller, we obtain a system of zeros that can be solved using readily 
available numerical recipes.38,39  
Having found *Aa  that most nearly satisfies the first order condition, which we 
call our optimal constrained strategy of order 1 (k=1), it is natural to wonder how 
good this equilibrium approximation is. For instance, supposing that 1An −  sellers 
follow the strategy of bidding *Aa c×  and 
Bn  sellers follow the strategy of bidding 
*Ba c× , how well could the omitted Type A seller do by changing their offer? The 
concept of equilibrium being built on the idea of unilateral deviation, it is natural to 
measure the “goodness” of an equilibrium approximation by how well one seller 
could do by discarding the *a -strategy in favor of another; we would like this 
seller’s profit from deviating to be as small as possible. If the benefits to pursuing 
another strategy are large, we might suppose that sellers would no longer restrict 
themselves to simple linear strategies. Instead, it seems reasonable to assume that 
sellers might pursue more complex strategies, should the reward to doing so be 
substantial. In what follows, we estimate a constrained strategic equilibrium as a 
sequence of polynomials. We then measure the goodness of a constrained strategic 
                                                 
38 We use canned routines included in MATLAB’s optimization toolbox and KNITRO, a suite of 
algorithms made freely available for academic and personal use by Ziena (http://www.ziena.com/). 
39 We find the vector of polynomials ( ) ( ),A BK Kc cβ β⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  that most nearly satisfy (30), subject to 
theoretical restrictions. We force AKβ  and 
B
Kβ  to be monotonic and for ( ),A B B BK c cβ =  . The last 
restriction means that a bidder receiving the worst possible cost draw will submit a bid exactly equal to 





equilibrium of degree K by the increase in expected profit an unconstrained seller can 
obtain if all other sellers abide by the constrained strategy.40  
Numerical Results 
In all cases we fix Type A sellers to draw their costs from the uniform 
distribution on [0,100]. We generate asymmetry by making a Type B distribution that 
shifts the Type A distribution by a constantδ , giving a support on[ ],100δ δ+ . 
Symmetric Sellers 
We first demonstrate the CSE technique when sellers are symmetric, which 
allows us to benchmark the CSE against the well-known equilibrium bid strategy 
derived by Weber (1983) and Ortega-Reichert (1968).41 We show how successively 
higher-degree polynomials better approximate the true equilibrium bid function. We 
also illustrate a measure of the approximation error that we can apply even to the 
asymmetric case that has no known closed-form solution. We examine the 
asymmetric cases in the next subsection.  
Figure 13 shows the Nash Equilibrium bid function and the linear CSE bids when 
10 sellers compete for the right to sell 6 identical goods to the bid-taker. The linear 
strategy approximation captures the general slope of the Nash Equilibrium bid 
function quite well. A better approximation is desirable, however. To see why, we 
calculate the best response of a unilateral deviator. If all but one seller were using the 
linear CSE strategy, how well could one informed player do by optimizing on his 
                                                 
40 That is, we allow a single bidder to deviate by following the best unilateral strategy, where this new 
strategy is constrained by a K K> . K is chosen to be sufficiently large that the deviating bidder is 
essentially unconstrained. 




own? The answer turns out to be that a nearly 16% increase in average profits is 
possible if a seller optimally deviates. We denote by ( )Q k  the measure of 
approximation quality with Monte Carlo size mc for any degree k of the CSE ( 1k =  
for linear strategies, 2k =  for quadratic strategies, etc.). ( )Q k  is calculated as  
 






CSE k CSE k CSE k
i i j i i j
i j
CSE k











where ( );i ib s−Π represents the profits accruing to seller i when seller i submits the 
bid ib , and all other sellers follow the strategy is− ,
*
ib is the optimal bid for seller i , 
conditional on all others bidding according to ( )CSE k , and ( )CSE kΠ is the expected 
profit from following the equilibrium strategies. 42  












































































Theoretical Equilibrium Cost Line CSE Linear
 
                                                 





An arbitrary seller following the linear CSE strategy will earn an average profit 
of $19.15, according to our computations. If this same seller optimally deviates while 
all his competitors follow the CSE strategy, he can expect to earn an additional $3.00, 
which amounts to the 16% increase reported above.  
We increase the degree of the polynomial strategy in order to approximate a 
constrained equilibrium with a lower benefit to unconstrained deviation. Figure 14 
displays the results of the quadratic CSE, again against the benchmark of the 
theoretical equilibrium. A large improvement in the approximation quality is 
immediately obvious, even from a cursory examination of the figure. This apparent 
improvement is confirmed by the (2)Q  statistic. The advantage to optimal deviation 
has declined markedly, from 16% in the linear case to 2.5% in the quadratic case. The 
quadratic strategies approximate true equilibrium more closely, and generate a much 
lower payoff to deviation from the constrained strategy. 


















































































Increasing the degree of the polynomial of the constrained strategy makes the 
quality of the approximation arbitrarily precise. Figure 15 shows the optimal quintic 
(CSE(5)) bid function as compared to the true Nash Equilibrium bids. In this case, the 
approximation is so good that the two lines overlay each other almost perfectly, so 
much so that they are difficult to distinguish. As a reference for the approximation 
quality possible with the CSE approach, the ( )5Q  statistic is 0.75%.  












































































Theoretical Equilibrium Cost Line CSE(5)
 
Asymmetric Sellers  
Now that we have demonstrated how well the computational technique works, 
we apply it to several asymmetric auctions. We calculate equilibrium approximations 
in three cases of asymmetry: low asymmetry ( 25δ = ), medium asymmetry ( 50δ = ), 
and high asymmetry ( 75δ = ). These cases are selected to demonstrate the decline in 
competition among low-cost sellers that occurs as the between-class heterogeneity 




five Type B sellers, and the procuring agent wishes to purchase six units. We begin 
by presenting the results graphically. The bidding functions for low, medium, and 
high asymmetry cases are presented in Figure 16 through Figure 18. Since there is no 
theoretical equilibrium for comparison, we plot only the highest-degree CSE bid 
function computed (CSE(5)). There are several things to notice.  





























































































































































Cost Line Type A, CSE(5) Type B, CSE(5)
 
 















































































In the low, medium, and high asymmetry cases, Type B sellers bid more 
aggressively than Type A sellers with the same cost draw. Since Type B sellers 
compete against a stronger cohort (they bid against four other Type B sellers and five 
Type A sellers rather than the reverse), the probability of a Type B seller winning is 
everywhere lower than the probability of a Type A seller winning. This result is 
consistent with theory. See, for example, Krishna (2002), p. 48. The phenomenon has 
been described as “weakness leads to aggression” (Krishna (2002); p. 47). Because 
weak sellers face stiffer competition, they face a lower conditional probability of 
winning. Ex ante, a strong seller is more likely to win than a weak seller, both having 
submitted the same bid. This lower probability of winning induces weak sellers to bid 
closer to their true cost; hence, “weakness leads to aggression.”  
Although Type B sellers bid more aggressively in all scenarios, the degree to 
which they bid more aggressively is increasing in the between-class heterogeneity. 
The relative aggressiveness of sellers can be seen as the vertical difference between 
Type A and Type B bid functions in Figure 16 through Figure 18. The distance 
between the bid functions increases as Type B sellers are progressively made weaker 
(i.e. their cost distributions are shifted higher), from the low asymmetry case in 
Figure 16 to the high asymmetry case in Figure 18. The increasing difference in 
bidding functions between Type A and Type B sellers is a result of Type A sellers 
increasing their bids in response to the weaker competition provided by 
Type B sellers. The same low-cost seller will increase their bid from about $70 in the 




about $100 in the high asymmetry case. These low-cost sellers extract the most rent 
from the auction process, and are the ones targeted by the imposition of a quota.  
The takeaway is that low-cost bidders are extracting rent because of the 
observable heterogeneity of the high-cost bidders. The greater is the observable 
heterogeneity, all else equal, the greater the rent extracted by the low-cost bidders. 
We have claimed that imposing a quota can reduce procurement cost by substantially 
reducing the rent accruing to low-cost bidders. We now examine the computed bid 
functions in auctions with a quota in order to determine if that claim is borne out.  
We present the estimated bid functions for auctions with a quota in Figure 19 
through Figure 22. The symmetric, low-, medium-, and high-asymmetry cases are 
presented, just as they were for the open auctions. In each case, the quota is enforced 
by a simple rule. The bids of no more than four Type A sellers and four Type B sellers 
can be accepted. The imposition of a quota has a pronounced impact on bidding 
behavior. When faced with both within- and between-group competition, low-cost 
sellers bid much more aggressively. As a direct demonstration of the quota-effect, we 
present Figure 23, which plots the bid functions before and after the imposition of a 
quota in the medium asymmetry case (the case will be examined in the laboratory 
experiment). Note the tradeoff of imposing a quota: Type A sellers submit 
significantly lower bids in an auction with a quota than in an open auction, while 
Type B sellers inflate their bids slightly to reflect their increased chances of winning 
















































































Cost Line Type A Type B
 
 

































































































































































Cost Line Type A Type B
 
 






















































































































































Cost Line Type A, No Quota Type B, No Quota
Type A, Quota Type B, Quota
 
 
Using these estimated bid functions, we are able to compute the total 
procurement cost to the bid-taker in constrained equilibrium. Table 2 presents the 
expected total procurement cost in low-, medium-, and high-asymmetry cases, with 
and without a quota. The imposition of a quota decreases procurement cost in all 
cases, although when asymmetry is low the difference is negligible. When between-
group asymmetry is high, however, the difference becomes more pronounced. We 
find that a quota can be an effective means to reduce procurement cost in situations of 
high seller asymmetry, while posing little risk of increasing procurement cost when 




Table 2 – Expected Total Procurement Cost 
Open Auction Quota Auction
381.6442 380.4208
(17.8699) (18.2493)
Open Auction Quota Auction
457.2948 452.2005
(16.112) (17.364)
Open Auction Quota Auction
531.4892 509.7331
(13.7573) (21.2654)
Open Auction Quota Auction
643.5566 564.8096
(15.668) (24.7912)
Expected Procurement Cost from Monte Carlo
Simulations.






A quota is capable of lowering procurement cost when sellers are asymmetric 
while not raising procurement cost when sellers are symmetric. This is a consequence 
of the fact that the returns to competition are increasing at a decreasing rate. In the 
IPV model of auctions, increasing competition reduces the rent accruing to the 
winning seller. However, as the number of sellers tends to infinity, the auction 
becomes perfectly competitive (see McAfee and McMillan (1987), for example); the 
effect of an extra seller on the behavior of existing sellers becomes negligible. That is, 
the returns to competition are increasing at a decreasing rate. Imposing a quota in an 




competition comes when we move from having one seller in an auction to having 
two. The marginal increase in competition is still high when we add a third, but 
declines as we continue to add additional sellers. Likewise, the returns to enforcing a 
small bit of competition, by creating artificial scarcity, are highest when the amount 
of competition starts out low, as it does among the Type A sellers in the auctions 
without a quota. In exchange for this extra competition encouraged among Type A 
sellers by the imposition of a quota, we increase the probability that a Type B seller 
will win the auction. This represents a decrease in competition facing Type B sellers. 
However, since Type B sellers were winning infrequently, i.e. competition was high, 
the decrease in competitive forces among Type B sellers is reduced from a point of 
relatively high competition.  
In the final chapter of the dissertation we turn to experimental evidence, where 
we examine bidder behavior in laboratory auctions constructed to match the medium-





Chapter 5:  Experimental Evidence 
Introduction 
We have two motivations for subjecting the quota mechanism to laboratory 
testing. First, closed-form theoretical predictions are difficult if not impossible to 
derive, so empirical validation complements the numerical computations presented 
above. Second, behavior may systematically differ from theory. We show a price 
discriminating mechanism that is “implementable” in the sense that: (1) the rules can 
be explained easily to sellers and (2) the results are robust to “misbehavior” by 
sellers. Human sellers are known to misbehave in that they do not always bid 
according to standard game theoretic concepts, even in environments where the 
mathematical theory suggests bidding should be straightforward.43 Thus, we desire to 
check that our results are robust to the actions of boundedly rational sellers. We put 
the auction institutions to their most rigorous test not by simulating particular types of 
misbehavior unilaterally, but by allowing a group of human sellers to compete for 
cash in a laboratory setting. 
Experimental Procedures 
We report on the results from 17 experimental sessions. Ten undergraduate 
students from the University of Maryland participated in each session. All 
experiments were computerized, using custom software.44 In each session, five of the 
                                                 
43 It is well known, for example, that bidders in second-price sealed-bid auctions frequently fail to 
submit bids equal to their costs, even though doing so is unambiguously optimal. See Kagel (1995), 
e.g. 




subjects were labeled as Type A sellers, and five of the subjects were labeled as Type 
B sellers. This information was provided on-screen; subjects did not know the Type-
identities of any of their competitors, but did know that there were a total of five Type 
A and five Type B sellers. Additionally, subjects knew that Type A sellers drew their 
costs randomly, with each amount between $0.00 and $100.00 being equally likely to 
occur, while Type B sellers drew costs between $50.00 and $150.00.  
Subjects entered the lab and were randomly assigned to a role, which 
corresponded to information displayed for them on their computer terminal when they 
sat down. Each subject listened as the instructions were read aloud. This way, each 
subject began with the same set of information, and any questions were answered 
publicly if part of the instructions were unclear.45 Subjects were then given time to re-
read the instructions on their own before the first auction began.46 Each subject had 
an opportunity to practice in their role before participating in an auction for real 
money. 
The treatment in the experiment was whether or not a quota was imposed. The 
design we employed was a within-design. Each subject participated in both open 
auctions and auctions with a quota. Because every subject participated in both 
treatments, we can make both within- and between-comparisons. The order of 
treatments was varied to control for learning effects, and in some sessions an “A-B-
A”-type design was employed to determine if individual bidding behavior within a 
treatment varied with experience. Because we varied the order in which subjects 
                                                 
45 Subjects were asked to raise their hand if they had a question. A monitor would listen to the question 
and the answer would then be given publicly if the question pertained to all subjects. 
46 We include some screenshots from the computerized auction environment in the appendix. This 
includes a “Welcome” screenshot that began every set of instructions. A full set of screenshots, as well 




faced different auction mechanisms, we are confident that our results are not 
influenced systematically by seller learning or order effects.47 During a given 
experimental treatment (each treatment lasted for at least 10 auctions), subjects 
maintained their Type-identity. That is, subjects did not change between Type A and 
Type B in sequential auctions.48  
We focus only on the medium asymmetry case in our experimental analysis. 
While there is probably some merit to confirming that procurement cost is further 
reduced by a quota as the between-group heterogeneity gets larger, we were 
concerned about perceived fairness in the experimental auctions.49 Further, it seems 
intuitively obvious that the benefit of employing any discriminating mechanism 
should increase as seller heterogeneity increases. Consequently we didn’t believe that 
it was necessary to test the quota auctions under the high asymmetry condition. On 
the other hand, we also do not test the quota mechanism when between-group 
heterogeneity is low. Given that we observe more aggressive bidding in our 
experimental sessions than we expected, this would have been desirable. We leave 
this for future research.  
Results 
We begin our analysis by presenting the data in full. Figure 24 shows a scatter plot of 
all bids against all costs in the open auction treatment, while  
                                                 
47 We discard the first 3 rounds of each treatment in our regression analysis, a standard practice in 
experimental economics, mean to account for an initially steep learning curve. Our results are robust to 
the inclusion or exclusion of additional rounds. We find no evidence for end-of-round type effects, and 
so do not exclude any auctions at the end of a treatment sequence. 
48 We did, however, experiment with changing bidder Types over treatments. 





Figure 25 shows a scatter plot of all bids against all costs in the quota treatment. The 
bidding behavior by Type and quartile is also summarized in Table 3. A brief 
inspection reveals that bidding behavior in the lab does broadly conform to that 
predicted by our computational results. In the open auction, competitive bids are 
almost flat, and centered about the predicted equilibrium margin (about $87). When 
cost draws are above the predicted margin, bids increase close to linearly with costs. 
On the other hand, in Figure 25 we see that bids from those with the lowest costs are 
depressed significantly by the imposition of a quota. The average bid for subjects 
with costs below $80 is reduced by about $10. The predicted impact of imposing a 
quota seems to be realized. Strong sellers feel increased competition and bid more 
aggressively as a result. The tradeoff should be that weaker sellers, on average, bid 
less aggressively. Their increased chance of winning should have caused them to 
increase their bids. Comparing the mean Type B bids from the auctions with and 
without a quota in Table 3, it would seem instead that Type B sellers bid more 
aggressively.50 
                                                 
50 These calculations are fully inclusive, however, and so the means may be unduly influenced by 
“throw away” bids. Individuals who assessed their chances of winning as being almost zero sometimes 




Table 3 – Bidding Behavior 
0 - 25 25 - 50 50 - 75 75 - 100 50 - 75 75 - 100 100 - 125 125 - 150
79.13 80.86689 92.04782 103.1273 94.81788 96.44045 129.6281 190.2178
(1.72) (1.15) (2.49) (2.98) (6.45) (0.74) (5.81) (18.03)
65.01 71.01 81.28 93.34 83.16 97.04 128 153.32
(1.59) (1.66) (1.04) (1.17) (0.99) (1.32) (8.03) (9.47)
0 - 25 25 - 50 50 - 75 75 - 100 50 - 75 75 - 100 100 - 125 125 - 150
62.30483 39.40278 21.63756 6.525411 17.0264 4.443 0.546931 -0.02237
(1.99) (1.24) (1.07) (0.75) (0.93) (0.56) (0.25) (0.07)
50.8 30.13 12.88 1.66 16.62 4.06 0.45 -1.53
(1.70) (1.81) (1.08) (0.30) (1.23) (0.55) (0.22) (1.63)
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Formal analysis of the experimental data follows the same pattern from the 
presentation of the computational evidence. We first present an econometric model of 
the bidding functions. We then present the empirical distribution of procurement cost 
with and without a quota. We calculate a series of counterfactual procurement cost 
distributions to increase the power of our tests and to check the robustness of our 
conclusions. We fit a panel model to our data and use it to predict procurement cost 
over a number of draws – a Monte Carlo experiment. The imposition of a quota has a 
more pronounced impact than anticipated.  
Econometric Model 
As in our computational model, we specify our econometric model such that each 
subject’s bid is a polynomial function of their cost draw. The panel nature of the data 
allows us to control for the effect of subject-specific bidding behavior by including 
fixed or random effects in our specification. That is, we specify 
 , , ,
1
K
i t i k i t i t
k
b cα β ε
=
= + +∑ i , 
where ,i tb ( ),i tc is the bid (cost draw) of subject i in auction t, ,i tε is a normally 
distributed error term, and 'siα and the 'sβ are parameters to be estimated.
51  
We estimated both regressions in which Type A and Type B bids were pooled, 
and in which Type A and Type B bids were modeled separately.52 That is, we 
                                                 
51 In all specifications, a Hausman test supports the use of random effects in the sense that the null 
hypothesis of consistency is not rejected. Therefore, since random effects are more efficient than fixed 
effects under the null hypothesis, we report only the results of models with random effects. 
52 We ran the regression in which Type A and Type B bids were modeled separately by including a full 
set of interaction terms of a dummy variable (D=1 if Type B, 0 otherwise) with each polynomial cost 
term. This is not identical to running two completely separate models in the case of a panel data 




estimated regressions where only a single bidding function was specified, which 
would be appropriate if Type A and Type B bidding behavior was indistinguishable, 
and regressions where Type A and Type B bid functions had independent coefficients. 
For both the pooled and separate regressions, we ran restricted and unrestricted 
models.53 We present here only the unrestricted models. The omitted results are 
qualitatively similar.  
We present the results in Table 4 for open auctions, and Table 5 for auctions with 
a quota. The pooled models (single bid function) fit the data well, but the chi-square 
statistic testing the joint significance of all interacted variables in regressions (2) and 
(4) lead us to conclude that Type A and Type B seller behavior should be modeled 
separately. The predictions from our selected model are shown in Figure 26. In fact, 
the predictions of the model look extremely similar to what was predicted by theory, 
as can be seen by comparison with Figure 23. We run a simple Monte Carlo 
experiment, showing what the distribution of procurement cost would be in repeated 
experiments, assuming the estimated coefficients of our econometric model are the 
true coefficients. The results are displayed in Figure 27. The mean procurement cost 
in an auction without a quota is $526.56, compared to a mean procurement cost of 
$477.53 in an auction with a quota.  
                                                 
53 We use our econometric model to test the theoretical restrictions placed on our computational model. 
Specifically, we test whether or not ( )B B Bc cβ = , or whether the bidder with the highest possible cost 
draw submits a bid equal to their cost draw. With this restriction and the assumption of monotonicity, 
this implies that no Type B bidder would bid more than Bc . Additionally we test whether or not we 
can impose the restriction that ( )A B Bc cβ = . In all cases our data rejects the theoretical restrictions 
based on a likelihood ratio test. Consequently, the coefficients we derive in our CSE calculations are 
not directly comparable to the coefficients we estimate econometrically. The predicted bidding 




Table 4 – Econometric Model of the Open Auction 
main
Cost 0.316* (2.57) -0.470* (-2.02)
Cost 2̂ -1.620** (-3.29) 3.267* (2.34)
Cost 3̂ 3.401*** (4.59) -7.062* (-2.29)
Cost 4̂ -1.596*** (-4.30) 5.625* (2.48)
Cost*B 5.205* (2.02)
(Cost 2̂)*B -16.20* (-2.54)
(Cost 3̂)*B 22.82** (3.19)
(Cost 4̂)*B -12.09*** (-3.63)
B -0.659 (-1.72)
Constant 0.532*** (48.74) 0.565*** (41.18)
sigma_u
Constant 0.0595*** (14.60) 0.0595*** (14.62)
sigma_e
Constant 0.0589*** (53.33) 0.0584*** (53.33)
Observations 1556 1556
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001
B=1 if TypeB,  0 otherwise
chi2(  4) =  428.55
chi2(  4) =   20.83
Test of 
joint 
chi2(  4) = 4555.81
Bid Bid








Table 5 – Econometric Model of the Auction with Quota 
main
Cost 0.361* (1.99) -0.254 (-0.74)
Cost 2̂ -1.168 (-1.67) 2.757 (1.39)
Cost 3̂ 2.535* (2.48) -6.547 (-1.52)
Cost 4̂ -1.151* (-2.31) 5.712 (1.82)
Cost*B -1.780 (-0.52)
(Cost 2̂)*B 0.986 (0.12)
(Cost 3̂)*B 4.754 (0.50)
(Cost 4̂)*B -5.476 (-1.23)
B 0.425 (0.83)
Constant 0.440*** (28.88) 0.451*** (23.23)
sigma_u
Constant 0.0437*** (8.30) 0.0412*** (8.36)
sigma_e
Constant 0.0500*** (32.65) 0.0495*** (32.72)
Observations 590 590
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001
B=1 if TypeB,  0 otherwise
chi2(  4) =  491.52
chi2(  4) =    8.58
Test of 
joint 
chi2(  4) = 2947.84
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Figure 27 – Distribution of Procurement Cost in Repeated Experiments 




















We use the same estimated coefficients to run an additional counterfactual 
experiment. We predict what the procurement cost would have been if the exact cost 
draws received by sellers in the auctions without a quota were instead obtained in the 
auctions with a quota, and vice-versa. Simply, we swap the cost draws received by 
subjects in the quota treatment with the cost draws received by subjects in the open 
auction treatment. We do this to ensure that our findings are not an artifact of a set of 
lucky draws that somehow made the quota treatment appear to produce more 
aggressive bidding and lower procurement costs.  
When we apply the estimated coefficients to the swapped cost draws, we obtain 
results summarized in Figure 28. Nonparametric tests confirm that the data do not 
come from identical distributions. Procurement cost in auctions with a quota is 
significantly lower than in auctions without a quota.  
Figure 28 – Distribution of Procurement Cost in Repeated Experiments with 
Actual Cost Draws 




















We have thus far examined the procurement costs that would be realized, on 
average, if sellers followed the strategies given by our econometric model. Some 
amount of “smoothing” takes place when we base our procurement cost estimates on 
our econometric model, however, since the influence of outliers is minimized. We 
turn finally to a direct analysis of the observed procurement cost data in each auction 
of the laboratory experiment.  
Procurement Cost 
We plot a histogram of the procurement cost under both treatments over all 
sessions in Figure 29. It is apparent that the mean procurement cost in an auction with 
a quota is lower than the mean procurement cost in an auction without a quota. A 
Komogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis of identical distributions, 
supporting the finding that procurement cost is lower in an auction with a quota. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic54 is based on the maximum distance between the 
two empirical CDFs, which we plot in Figure 30. The empirical CDF of procurement 
cost in an auction without a quota stochastically dominates the empirical CDF of 
procurement cost in an auction with a quota. A Mann-Whitney rank-sum test bolsters 
our conclusion (rank-sum = 7054; p-value = 4.6e-9).  
                                                 




Figure 29 – Distribution of Procurement Cost 






















Figure 30 – Empirical CDFs of Procurement Cost 


















We carry out a recombinant estimation procedure to complement the above 
tests.55 In order to make sure that our procurement cost statistics are not unduly 
influenced by a small number of anomalous bids, we recombine bids made in a given 
auction with bids made in other auctions. In this way, we can create hypothetical 
auctions – auctions that did not take place but could have taken place, thus increasing 
our sample size. To be clear, we present a simple example. Denote by ,t ib the bid 
placed by seller i in auction t, [1,10],  [1, ]i t T∈ ∈ . Each auction 1,…,T occurred inside 
the lab, generating payments to subjects. A vector of bids exists for each auction that 
did take place, for example the first: ( )1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,5 1,6 1,7 1,8 1,9 1,10        b b b b b b b b b b . An 
outcome that could have occurred but did not is given by 
( )28,1 63,2 46,3 27,4 37,5 11,6 57,7 66,8 85,9 25,10        b b b b b b b b b b , i.e. the bid of the first seller in the 
28th auction, the second seller in the 63rd auction, and so on. This vector of bids 
represents an auction for which we can calculate our outcome of interest, 
procurement cost.  
The assumption underlying the procedure is exchangeability. The manifestation 
of this assumption in terms of a sealed-bid auction is simply that when a subject 
makes a bid, there are only two pieces of information relevant to his decision: (1) his 
cost draw; (2) his knowledge of the distribution of his opponents’ costs. If this 
assumption is reasonable, it allows us to treat the bids submitted in any auction as 
exchangeable, and thus to create a large set of valid hypothetical auctions that we can 
evaluate. 
                                                 




We carry out a recombinant procedure using the algorithm outlined in the 
appendix. We use this algorithm to generate auctions, which we then solve and 
compute procurement cost statistics for. The results are summarized by the histogram 
presented in Figure 31. The conclusions we drew from the raw data are supported by 
what we find using the recombinant procedure. Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests again reject the null hypothesis of identically distributed procurement 
costs.  
Figure 31 – Procurement Cost under Recombinant Procedure 


















The key question we have set out to answer is whether or not the changes we 
observe in seller behavior between auctions without a quota and auctions with a quota 
add up to a more cost-effective auction from the perspective of the bidtaker. The 
experimental results do confirm our computational finding that auctions with a quota 




institutions is more than we expected, however. We estimate that average 
procurement cost was reduced by 8.7% in the auctions with simple quota as compared 
to the open auctions (Table 6). Compare this to an expected reduction in procurement 
cost of 4.1%. Total procurement cost was lower than expected in all experimental 
auctions. Auctions without a quota were 2.4% less costly than expected, while 
auctions with a quota were 7.1% less costly than expected.  
Table 6 – Experimental / CSE Comparison 
Open Quota Open Quota
Avg cost $518.57 $473.30 $531.49 $509.73
SD 63.24 54.19 13.76 21.27







Chapter 6:  Conclusions 
In this dissertation I have outlined the CSE procedure proposed by Armantier, 
Florens and Richard (2008) for approximating the equilibrium bid functions of an 
auction. I have explored the performance of the procedure in relation to the prevailing 
computational methods in the literature, and I have programmed an algorithm that 
allows a CSE solution to be found for a general auction problem. The modular nature 
of this algorithm allows many auction problems to be solved using a consistent 
program, avoiding rewriting for special cases. This is the first work of which I am 
aware to apply a computational equilibrium program to a multi-unit auction case. In 
those cases when an analytical equilibrium can be found, it has been shown that the 
computational algorithm yields nearly exact results, even in the multi-unit case.  
The CSE algorithm has been used to predict outcomes in a multi-unit, 
asymmetric procurement auction problem, and these predictions have been compared 
to the outcomes of a laboratory experiment. The direction of the comparative static 
predictions given by the CSE algorithm have been confirmed by the laboratory 
experiment. 
The CSE algorithm and computational program given here can be useful for 





Appendix A – Permission to Reproduce Figures 
What follows is the exact text of the license agreement obtained in order to be 

























Appendix B – Instructions for Laboratory Experiment 
The following screenshots are samples of the instructions used for the laboratory 
experiment reported in chapter 5. The instructions had a modular design such that the 
order of treatment could be varied continuously and randomly. Thus the entire 
instructions for any one experimental session were composed of instructions similar 
to those displayed here. Instructions used in a given session and for a given treatment 
are available upon request. 
 
Welcome! 
Today you will be participating in an experiment on economic decision making.  
If you follow the instructions and make good decisions, you can earn a considerable 
amount of money, which will be paid to you after the experiment is over.  
Just for participating in this experiment, you will receive a participation payment of 
$5.00. However, you can earn substantially more by actively taking part in the 
experiment. Your total earnings will be paid to you in cash at the conclusion of the 
experiment.   
We will begin by conducting several auctions. In each auction, you and all other 
participants are sellers and there is a single buyer. The single buyer is a computer. 
The buyer will be purchasing tickets, which you will be given, in each auction.  
We will be conducting 40 auctions today, one after the other. Each auction will take 
about 1 minute. They are all separate, independent auctions. Your bid and earnings in 
any one auction will have no influence on your earnings in any other auction.  
These instructions will describe how the auction works and prepare you for the 
auctions. After describing each topic, a list of bullet points will be provided to 
summarize the topic just introduced. During the experiment you will be able click on 
the Summary of this auction's rules link in the upper left-hand corner of your web 






During an auction, each one of you will have a single ticket that you may offer for 
sale to the buyer.  
To offer your ticket for sale, you will submit a bid. The lower your bid the higher the 
chance your bid will be accepted. If your bid is accepted, you will receive your bid 
minus a cost that will be posted on your ticket. You will only incur this cost if your 
bid is accepted.  
The cost of your ticket will be randomly determined separately and independently for 
each bidder in each auction in the experiment.  
Both the cost and your bid will be denominated in a currency called E-Bucks. Each E-
Buck will be converted into dollars at the end of the experiment at a rate of .05 real 
dollars per E-Buck.   
Thus your total earnings 
for the experiment will be: 
   
(Your $5.00. participation payment )  
+  







... and where Your net 
earnings  equals :   
(Sum of your accepted bids ) 
-  
(Sum of costs on your accepted tickets )  
 
 
Types of Bidders 
There are two types of bidders in the room. Some of you are Type A bidders and some 
of you are Type B bidders. You will find out which type you are, and the cost of your 
ticket, when you advance to the bidding screen.  
For Type A bidders, cost may be any amount (rounded to the penny) between and 
including $0 and $100, with each amount being equally likely.  
Imagine a roulette wheel with the stops labeled at $0.00, $0.01, $0.02,..., $99.98, 
$99.99, $100.00  
A hard spin of the wheel would make each of these values equally likely.  
Similarly, for Type B bidders cost may be any amount (rounded to the penny) 
between and including $50 and $150, with each amount being equally likely.  




Before each auction you will be given a new ticket, with a new randomly chosen cost, 
regardless of whether or not you sold your ticket in the previous auction. In other 
words, each auction is truly independent. Your actions in any auction will have no 







More on Bidder Types  
Even though you will receive a new ticket before each auction, your bidder Type will 
remain the same.  
•  If you are a Type A bidder, you will always be a Type A bidder.  
•  If you are a Type B bidder, you will always be a Type B bidder.  
Your random cost for any round will be known to you and only you. Do not let 
anyone else see it. You will learn your random cost at the beginning of each timed 
round. You will have up to a minute to submit your bid after learning your random 
cost. You can, however, submit a bid as soon as you like after learning your random 
cost.  
We will review how you submit your bid in a few moments.  
Although the cost of your ticket differs from other bidders in the room, the buyer 
values all tickets equally. To the buyer, any one ticket is as good as any other ticket.  
Review of Types of Bidders  
•  There are 10 total bidders (you plus 9 others).  
•  There are two Types of bidders:  
•  5 of you are a Type A bidders  
•  5 of you are a Type B bidders.  
•  Each ticket has a cost printed on it. 
The cost, randomly drawn from the Type A or Type B interval, will be 















Rules of the Game 
During each auction you will have a chance to submit any bid you choose by clicking 
in the Your bid  textbox on the screen and using your number keys.  
Once all bidding tickets are received, they will be compiled and winners will be 
determined.  
The buyer will accept the lowest 6 bids in each auction.  
Payments will be calculated as follows:  
• If your ticket is rejected, you will earn nothing for that auction.  
• If your ticket is accepted, you will receive your bid minus the cost printed on 
your ticket.  
• Please note carefully: If your bid is less than your cost, and your ticket is 
accepted, you will lose money in that auction. This amount (converted from 
E-bucks to dollars) will be subtracted from your $5.00 participation payment.  
 
Making an offer 
We will run one practice auction so that you can familiarize yourself with the bidding 
screen and the process. You may raise your hand to ask questions at any time during 
the practice auction.  
• To submit a bid simply click in the Your bid  textbox on the screen and use 
your number keys to enter your offer.  




• By the conclusion of the timed round, you must submit a bid for your ticket.  
• You may submit your offer at any time before the timed round expires, if you 
wish.  
• There is a timer on the offer screen to assist you in budgeting your time. If 
you have not submitted a bid by the time the auction expires, the bid displayed 
on-screen will be submitted for you automatically.  
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